Vangelovski,
I am not debating your view on the interplay of democratic republicanism and Constitutions as you are much better versed and qualified in that area and, in any case, I understand and agree with the concepts. However, my understanding is that these ideals need to be enshrined in the Constitution itself rather than the subsequent power that is exercised. Basically, I'm trying to make the point that in Macedonia's case the problem lies in the Constitution and the administrative law structure of the nation as opposed to the actual exercise of the power (although the Macedonian Government should be criticised for not attempting fix the Constitution).
Before I go into further analysis, as you can see I am preoccupied with the Australian Constitution for two primary reasons: 1. it is well drafted and 2. I am more familiar with it than any other. Accordingly, I cannot discount the possibility that the experience in Australia is not transferable to Macedonia's situation, so would appreciate if anyone can provide greater insight into that.
The key issue that I am battling with is trying to figure out what the negotiations are and how this interacts with the Constitution. You suggest that the Macedonian government (as a republican government) is presuming an authority to "negotiate the Constitution with a foreign government". Firstly, the Macedonian Constitution does provide extremely broad powers (just like the Australian Constitution) but the legality of the exercise of said powers depends on the characterisation of the power in the relevant court (Constitutional Court in Macedonia; High Court in Australia) upon challenge. In Australia, judicial decisions have enforced the view that the Commonwealth's powers should be interpreted broadly, as opposed to narrowly by the High Court (see Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129 -otherwise known as the Engineer's Case http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1920/54.html). So, in Australia, I can easily see such negotiations characterised as an exercise of the External Affairs power mentioned in my previous post. In Macedonia's case, we know that the Constitution is not as descriptive as Australia's, but it vests broad powers nonetheless. Now, I have absolutely no idea at how Macedonia's Constitutional Court operates nor have I substantially researched historical decisions, but I suspect that the negotiations could be found squarely within the powers afforded by the Constitution for a couple of reasons:
1. Quite simply, the Constitution gives them that power. The Articles that have been presented by Rogi, Buktop and myself attest to this. Whether or not there is a presumption of the authority is immaterial if it falls within a prescribed power and, if we follow Australia's lead, in Macedonia's case it will.
2. The negotiations are central policy issue in Macedonia today. As undemocratic and "corrupt" as it may sound, I don't see a relatively young Macedonian Constitutional Court stopping this.
An obvious question is why should powers be interpreted broadly? A key reason is context. An article of a Constitution can tend to lose its meaning a couple of hundred years down the track (e.g. Second Amendment to the United States Constitution - The right to keep and bear arms) so courts should necessarily interpret them broadly. Of course, it sounds absurd that a Government can effectively "presume" an authority, as you suggest, but in most cases, it is a legitimate presumption. This reiterates the point that the Constitution itself must espouse the ideals of democracy rather than relying on the executive to do so as a Government, being what it is, will do whatever it can unless it is successfully challenged.
Your next question may be: how then can a Constitution engender democratic principles if Governments are effectively given free reign? As you suggest, it is the factors that limit the government - namely the Constitution itself, the administrative law structures (i.e. Constitutional/High Courts; Ombudsmans; etc.) and the people. Herein lies the divergence between Macedonia and Australia and an answer to your observation that it is the Constitution that is being negotiated. As I have explained earlier, Australia has s128 (requirement of referendum to change the Australian Constitution) whereas Macedonia has Articles 129-131 (Constitution can be changed without referendum). The significance of this is that the Australian Government would not pursue such negotiations (effectively not exercising their power) as there would be no chance that the outcome would be "ratified" by the Australian people. On the other hand, the possibility remains in Macedonia that the Government can unilaterally ratify the outcome of the negotiations (and change the Constitution). The limit that would be apply in Australia is non-existent in Macedonia and no matter how much Gruevski or Ivanov say that referendum will decide, I cannot be convinced. There are obvious problems with the Constitutional Court and administrative law bodies in Macedonia that also facilitate this, but I don't want to complicate things further.
I know the above analysis may seem long-winded but I assure you it is very abbreviated and lacking in proper research, so take from it what you will. In the future, I hope to take further research and hopefully write and disseminate a proper analysis and comparison.
Phoenix,
The underlying point I'm trying to make is that you cannot separate the ideals of democracy from a Constitution and analyse one in the other's terms - if you integrate both Vangelovski's and Buktop's arguments you'll see that the problem is both with the Macedonian Constitution and the Government that is using (or abusing?) it. Essentially, I am criticising the Macedonian Constitution for its flaws but also the Macedonian Government for not fixing these flaws (even though the exercise of their power is, I believe, legitimate in the purely legal sense of the word). Unfortunately, the political situation is such that Macedonia has continually neglected its Constitution and I feel that until it is put into order, the Republic of Macedonia will not progress.
Very nicely put Dzog, my point in arguing that the Government of the Republic of Macedonia is bestowed the power to negotiate is to highlight the fact that the constitution (arguably) is either not properly worded or interpreted. I was surprised when I read the articles concerning the power of the government to alter the constitution without the consent of the people, but this was already proven upon signing of the Interim Accord.
As I have stated before numerous times, I do not disagree with Vangelovski's interpretation of the application of political and legal theories, what I do disagree with is his take on the "reality" of the application and practice of those theories and actual existence of such clauses within the constitution of the Republic of Macedonia that seem to act in contradiction with these theories.
I also find it very interesting that even when put to referendum in 2004, the citizens of Macedonia willingly allowed the government to federalize the Albanian minority through the redrawing of municipalities, and in turn forgo the rights of the citizens residing in the effected area's. I also believe it is the indifference (forced or willing) of the citizens that plays a major factor in many aspects of the power assumed by the government. In Australia and the US there exists a higher willingness to maintain a level of control over government actions, whereas in Macedonia, there is a significant lack of involvement or exercised authority of the citizens to control the actions of the government. I believe this to be caused by the previous era where the rights of the citizens were either limited, or non-existent. I also completely agree that the avenues in which citizens are given to exercise their authority, i.e. the constitutional court, are not particularly well developed.