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Financial Crisis in Greece

Good work on Slovakia for standing up and not allowing themselvs to be forced by the racist EU to assist a failed shithole country like grease.
The response from the french idiot just shows that the EU is not a happy little economic union but a pseudo-empire ruled by germanics and frenchmen. All other smaller and weaker nations. mainly eastern european ones, are nothing more then slaves and cannon fodder.

Notice in the article that new member Slovakia is still relatively poor and its wages are much more smaller to the grks - this just shows joining the EU wont magically transform your lives into prosperous happy times - macedonians should take notice.

Funny thing is the Czech republic wanted to leave Czechoslovakia because it had to support the "poor" slovak republic, and slovenia wanted to leave yugoslavia because it was sick and tired of supporting the poorer republics like Bosnia and macedonia. Yet ironically in their new little EU bubble they are now forced to do the same thing, but this time support a bigger problem - GREECE.

Have fun guys :)
 
Totally agree BBS.

Also (he said) that the ECB would not back future euro zone applicants if there is a risk they will do something similar.

Surely a question for the Macedonian EU aspirants is "would you join the EU if there was a proviso that you HAD to support loans to countries such as Greece?"
 
The New Greeks havn't been able to produce honest statistics in any field - economics, demographics, fiscal balances...etc, since 1830.

The Slovaks were right to snub them.
 
Is Ireland the next Greece?

Is Ireland the next Greece?

http://curiouscapitalist.blogs.time.com/2010/09/22/is-ireland-the-next-greece/


Is Ireland the next Greece?
Posted by Michael Schuman Wednesday, September 22, 2010 at 5:18 am

Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero declared to The Wall Street Journal this week that the economic crisis in Europe has ended. "I believe that the debt crisis affecting Spain, and the euro zone in general, has passed," Zapatero said. He probably hasn't been watching the ongoing trials and tribulations of Ireland. Once the zone's official poster child of reform, Ireland has found itself in the bright spotlight of investor concern in recent weeks. Bond markets have signaled that investors consider Irish sovereign bonds increasingly risky to hold. The spread between the yields on Irish bonds and benchmark German bonds has been widening, even reaching a euro-era high earlier this week (before tapering back slightly). Ireland has not yet been shut out from fresh borrowing – the government successfully sold $2 billion of bonds on Tuesday. But the government only raised such funds at a cost much higher than in previous auctions.

That begs the crucial question: How vulnerable is Ireland to a sovereign debt crisis?
The worry is that the country's ongoing banking crisis, continued poor economic performance, high government deficits and rising sovereign debt could combine to bring into question Ireland's solvency. Ireland's banking sector has been slammed by property-related losses and the government is still digging the economy out of the problem. Nonperforming loans – which were 9% of total loans in 2009 -- likely haven't bottomed out yet. In August, rating agency Standard & Poor's estimated the total cost to the state of bailing out the banking sector would reach the equivalent of 58% of Ireland's GDP and that as a result, its government debt-to-GDP ratio, the primary measure of a country's sovereign debt burden, could hit 113% by 2012. Earlier this month, in a bid to calm investors, the government moved to split nationalized Anglo Irish Bank into two pieces, one which would house its deposits and the other that would attempt to recover as much as possible of its beleaguered loan portfolio.

Ireland's problems go well beyond the banking sector. In a recent report, Credit Suisse summarized just how ugly things have gotten: GDP is 10% below its peak (in real terms), the budget deficit could hit 12% of GDP this year, and government debt has risen by 60% of GDP since 2007.

But despite these woes, some analysts have argued that Ireland is not in the same predicament as Greece. That Credit Suisse report goes on to say that Ireland seems to have its problems under control. Here's a bit of the reasoning:

Markets are right to be concerned about Ireland. But there are several positive points that shouldn't be disregarded. The process of deficit consolidation is well on track: the deficit has already started to fall…Ireland is also in an extremely strong financing position. This year's funding needs have almost all been met. We estimate next year's financing needs to be a manageable €30bn (18% of GDP). That's especially the case as we think the Irish government holds over €20bn in cash, providing a considerable buffer if market conditions become problematic. And perhaps more importantly, recovery is underway…The euro's recent decline, boosted by falling prices in Ireland, has led to a sharp improvement in competitiveness. That's having an effect – industrial production is already back above its pre-recession peak.


So Credit Suisse concluded:

Ireland's problems are considerable, and will likely remain so for some time. But, so far, the government and the economy seem to be doing reasonably well at coping with and addressing them.

Barclays Capital in a recent report reached similar conclusions:

We believe a default is unlikely because of: the Irish government's policy track record; the potential willingness of the EU to help Ireland should it suffer additional problems; the global search for yield; and finally, the more comfortable liquidity position.

But that doesn't mean Ireland is out of the woods. Barclays expects the Irish economy to contract again in 2010, by 0.5% compared to the year before. Barclays also holds out the possibility that Ireland may need aid to get through its financial crisis:

However, the lack of fiscal space over the medium term to tackle future unexpected losses in the banking system does constitute a source of market instability. In our view, if the macroeconomic conditions deviate from our baseline recovery scenario and unexpected losses crop up in the financial sector, then the government's best option at stabilizing adverse market dynamics would indeed be by drawing on financial assistance from the EU-IMF… We believe that the Irish government has, to a large extent, deployed the right economic and financial policies thus far. The problem is that, despite these policy efforts, the government has very few options left of its own.

Perhaps more worrying than Ireland's specific problems is that we're constantly asking which European nation is the next Greece. That shows how Europe has not yet arrived a true, comprehensive solution for addressing its debt and growth problems, or the investor concerns created as a result. Mohamed A. El-Erian, chief executive of fund management firm PIMCO, wrote on the FT's Alphaville blog that the persistence of high bond yields for countries like Ireland shows that Europe's entire strategy for dealing with its weaker economies needs to change:

The failure to reduce risk spreads means that the public sector bailout is not working. Rather than provide assurances of better times ahead and, thus, encourage new investments, ECB/EU/IMF support funding is being used by existing investors to exit their exposures to the most vulnerable peripheral European countries. This situation cannot be sustained forever. It undermines any chance that the most vulnerable countries (e.g., Greece) have of limiting the collapse in their GDP and maintaining social cohesion; it contaminates the balance sheet of the ECB; it exposes the revolving nature of IMF resources to considerable risk; and it raises the risk of renewed contagion.

I'm happy that Spain's Zapatero is feeling more confident. And he probably has good reason to be, since Europe has made progress in solving the problems that sparked its debt crisis. But not enough progress.



Read more: http://curiouscapitalist.blogs.time.com/2010/09/22/is-ireland-the-next-greece/#ixzz10Gbmi19x


It's amazing how the word "Greece" continues to mean "bankrupt nation" :lol:
 
On the Secret Committee to Save the Euro, a Dangerous Divide

On the Secret Committee to Save the Euro, a Dangerous Divide

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703467004575464113605731560.html
By MARCUS WALKER, CHARLES FORELLE and BRIAN BLACKSTONE

BRUSSELS—Two months after Lehman Brothers collapsed in the fall of 2008, a small group of European leaders set up a secret task force—one so secret that they dubbed it "the group that doesn't exist."

Its mission: Devise a plan to head off a default by a country in the 16-nation euro zone.

When Greece ran into trouble a year later, the conclave, whose existence has never before been reported, had yet to agree on a strategy. In a prelude to a cantankerous public debate that would later delay Europe's response to the euro-zone debt crisis until the eleventh hour, the task force struggled to surmount broad disagreement over whether and how the euro zone should rescue one of its own. It never found the answer.

A Wall Street Journal investigation, based on dozens of interviews with officials from around the EU, reveals that the divisions that bedeviled the task force pushed the currency union perilously close to collapse. In early May, just hours before Germany and France broke their stalemate and agreed to endorse a trillion-dollar fund to rescue troubled euro-zone members, French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde told her delegation the euro zone was on the verge of breaking apart, according to people familiar with the matter.

The euro zone's near death had stakes for people around the world. A wave of government defaults on Europe's periphery could have triggered a new crisis in the international banking system, with even worse consequences for the global economy than the failure of Lehman.

The dangerous dithering was driven by ideological divisions that continue to paralyze the currency union's search for solutions to its structural flaws. Deep differences on economic policy between Europe's frugal north and laxer south, between Germany and France, and between national governments and central EU institutions hindered an effective early response to the crisis. Only when faced with calamity—the collapse of the euro zone—did leaders put aside their differences and reach a compromise.

Complicating matters: The two most important politicians deciding the fate of the euro often had conflicting agendas—and much at stake personally.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy, known in France as the "hyper-president" for his relentless flurry of new initiatives, faced declining approval ratings as his domestic economic overhaul stalled. The excitable 55-year-old leader saw that Greece's woes could rock the euro zone. Mr. Sarkozy seized on the issue as an opportunity to prove his leadership chops and thus shore up his popularity.

For German Chancellor Angela Merkel, 56, the crisis was the biggest test of her career. A trained physicist known for her cautious, deliberative style, she feared a backlash from German voters and lawmakers, and defeat in Germany's supreme court, if she risked taxpayer money on serial deficit-sinner Greece. Despite pressure from Mr. Sarkozy, she fiercely resisted a quick fix.

When Mr. Sarkozy barreled into one meeting with camera crews and photographers in tow, Ms. Merkel icily ordered the cameras out: "I won't let you do this to me," she said, warning she wouldn't play the part of "the stubborn old bag."

Europe eventually did establish a rescue fund in May. By then the price of calm had soared, requiring a pledge of €750 billion. It defused the panic but hasn't snuffed out the crisis: Unsustainable borrowing still poses huge challenges, especially in Greece and Ireland.

The danger of a government-debt crisis in the euro zone began to preoccupy top European policy makers in October 2008. Hungary, an EU member which doesn't use the euro, found itself unable to sell bonds to jittery investors. The EU, using an existing but little-used program, and the International Monetary Fund and World Bank swiftly propped up Hungary by pledging about €20 billion in loans.

But it soon became apparent that the euro zone had no tools to save one of its own. EU treaties made clear the facility used for Hungary was off limits to euro members. For most EU officials, the IMF was taboo, too: Its loans were fine for poor ex-Communist nations, they felt, but not for developed euro members.

In March 2009, French Treasury official Xavier Musca was preparing to step down as chairman of the Economic and Financial Committee, an influential body of technocrats who manage EU economic policy. He briefed his successor, Thomas Wieser of Austria, on the duties. At the end of a long list, he added one more. "Incidentally," Mr. Musca said, "there's a group that doesn't exist."

The secret task force, coordinated by the committee chairman, had been meeting surreptitiously since November 2008 to craft a plan should a Hungary-style crisis strike a euro nation. Membership was limited to senior policy makers—usually just below ministerial level—from France, Germany, the European Commission, Europe's central bank and the office of Jean-Claude Juncker, the Luxembourg premier who heads an assembly of euro finance ministers.

The task force met in the shadows of the EU's many councils and summits in Brussels, Luxembourg and other capitals, often gathering at 6 a.m. or huddling over sandwiches late at night. Participants kept colleagues in their own governments in the dark, for fear leaks would trigger rampant speculation in financial markets.

Potential crisis candidates were obvious: Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain, a group of deeply indebted states derisively tagged with the acronym "PIGS" by bond traders.

A gap quickly opened up between Germany, attached to euro-zone rules it viewed as banning bailouts for profligate countries, and France, which wanted greater freedom for national governments to support each other as they saw fit.

A fault line also developed over whether EU institutions should run any bailout operation. The European Commission, the union's executive branch, pushed for a central role in raising and lending funds—and found an ally in France. Germany, wary of a power grab, was deeply reluctant to put its cash in Brussels' hands.

The German finance ministry feared the commission was trying to establish a precedent for centralized European public borrowing, through EU bonds. That would imply Germany, Europe's strongest creditor, subsidizing other nations. Instead, Germany insisted any aid must come via loans by the individual euro-zone members to a stricken country. That way Berlin, writer of the biggest check, could control the process and force a wayward recipient to reform itself.

The philosophical divide among task-force members persisted for nearly a year. Last October, it ceased to be academic.

That month, Greece's newly elected Socialist government declared the country's 2009 budget deficit was heading for 12.5% of gross domestic product—more than three times the previous government's official forecast.

Stunned investors began to dump Greek bonds. Greece faced daunting debt repayments in spring 2010, and it wasn't at all clear if it would have the money to make them.

By February, it became obvious that the 16-nation euro zone would have to do something to address the Greek bond meltdown. The secret task force of France, Germany and EU bureaucrats opened its doors to the rest of the member countries—except Greece.

A summit of EU leaders had been planned for Feb. 11 to mull Europe's long-term economic goals. Governments insisted publicly that Greece was "not on the agenda." The hope, say aides to several European leaders, was that if Europe didn't upset the markets by talking about the matter, Greece might be able to sell enough bonds to escape trouble.

But Greek bond prices—a key measure of investor confidence—began plunging in the days before the meeting. Luxembourg's Mr. Juncker convened an emergency teleconference of euro-zone finance ministers on the eve of the summit. They agreed on a statement to be read at the summit's conclusion pledging "support" for Greece.

In Berlin's austere chancellery building, Ms. Merkel wasn't happy. Her advisers were telling her that Greece's problems ran deeper than a short-term cash shortage: The country was economically uncompetitive and living beyond its means. Without a deep overhaul, a quick-fix bailout would keep Greece afloat for only a few months, they warned. In addition, Germany's supreme court would strike down a bailout, the advisers warned, unless it was absolutely unavoidable.

Deep in the night, Ms. Merkel called other leaders, including President Sarkozy, and made it clear she would veto any promise of aid for Greece unless Athens took much tougher action to cut its public spending and overhaul its economy.

Mr. Sarkozy replied that Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou was already taking brave action.

"Now it is time for Europe to help," he said.

"The financial markets will say this is not a solution," Ms. Merkel told the French leader.

The next day's summit, on a Thursday, was scheduled for 10:15 a.m. at the Bibliotheque Solvay, a historic library on a Brussels hilltop. Late Wednesday, EU President Herman Van Rompuy of Belgium postponed it by more than two hours. Snowy weather was the official explanation given for the delay.

In reality, Mr. Van Rompuy huddled that morning in his office on the fifth floor of the EU's summit building with a few key leaders—including Ms. Merkel, Mr. Sarkozy and the head of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet. Other European leaders were cooling their heels at the library. On currency markets, the euro was gyrating in anticipation of a bold rescue—or a bust.

Mr. Sarkozy pushed the chancellor for a clear public declaration that Europe stood behind Greece. "I cannot buy that," Ms. Merkel responded.

Eventually, Mr. Van Rompuy brokered a compromise, in the form of a nine-word sentence tacked on to a statement aides were scribbling out on a conference table: "The Greek government has not requested any financial support." The language sneaked in a back-door mention of Greece, but it conformed to Ms. Merkel's insistence that the country not be offered any help.

She had won the round.

Other European leaders believed Ms. Merkel was playing for time because of domestic politics. Her center-right coalition faced a crucial regional election on May 9 in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany's most populous state. Opinion polls showed voters were furious about the prospect of bailing out the profligate Greeks.

"It was clear that the election was playing a big role," says the finance minister of another euro-zone country. Spokesmen for Ms. Merkel strenuously deny that North Rhine-Westphalia influenced her tactics on Greece.

The chancellor struggled to rein in speculation about an imminent bailout one Friday in late February, when the head of Germany's biggest bank, Deutsche Bank Chief Executive Josef Ackermann, mysteriously appeared in Athens for consultations with Greek leaders. Mr. Ackermann had an idea for supplying Greece with up to €30 billion of credit—half from Germany and France, half from major European banks.

In a phone call from Athens that day, Mr. Ackermann pitched the proposal to Ms. Merkel's chief economic adviser, Jens Weidmann. The reply: unacceptable. "You cannot tell the Greeks that this is a German government offer," Mr. Weidmann said, fearing the already-widespread impression that Mr. Ackermann was acting as a go-between.

A posse of cameras met Mr. Ackermann when he emerged from the Greek parliament building. "I'm regularly in Greece because I love Greece and the beautiful weather," a grinning Mr. Ackermann said, before disappearing into his armored Mercedes-Benz.

By mid-March, Greek Premier Papandreou was clamoring openly for Europe to reassure markets by putting money on the table. Ms. Merkel went on German public radio that month and said Greece didn't need aid. An upcoming EU summit should focus on other issues—and other European leaders shouldn't stir up "false expectations," she said.

But behind the scenes, Ms. Merkel was starting to take over the contingency planning.

There was one thing the secret task force had agreed on: Europe, not the IMF, would handle any bailout. The German finance ministry felt the same. Involving the Washington-based fund in a bailout of Greece would be an admission of European weakness, Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble said publicly. Mr. Sarkozy, Mr. Juncker and ECB chief Trichet all shared that view strongly.

Ms. Merkel, however, overruled them all. Her advisers were telling her that aid to Greece could be sold to her skeptical countrymen only as part of a wrenching IMF program of economic adjustment for Greece. IMF-inflicted pain would also deter other indebted euro-zone countries from seeking aid.

The disagreement came to a head before the broader EU's regular spring summit in Brussels on March 25.

That afternoon, before all 27 leaders gathered, Ms. Merkel met Mr. Sarkozy in one of the many spartan meeting rooms in the EU's warren-like headquarters. The chancellor agreed to announce that the euro zone would rescue Greece if it faced default—but only as a last resort, once Greece had exhausted its access to capital markets. Also, the IMF must be part of any loan package, and the IMF—not the European Commission—should draw up Greece's program of overhauls, she said.

Mr. Sarkozy protested against involving the IMF, whose biggest shareholder is the U.S. government. Europe cannot let "the Americans" decide who gets credit in Europe, he said.

Ms. Merkel put her foot down, insisting that only the IMF had the necessary experience. Mr. Sarkozy, recognizing that Germany's financial muscle was essential for any bailout, reluctantly gave way.

On April 11, with the crisis of investor confidence spreading from Greek government bonds to the country's banking system, the EU finally put money on the table. As Germany wanted, the €30 billion for the first year would come in the form of 15 separate government-to-government loans, while the IMF would lend another €15 billion. Officials hoped the sum, enough to cover Greece's borrowing needs for less than a year, would be enough to calm markets.

It wasn't.


— David Gauthier-Villars contributed to this article.
 
US the largest shareholder?
Interesting stuff, seeing how Greece went down and US economy crumbles and GFC Oct 2008 was like a domino effect.
Greece has the world by the balls.
And yet, the world continues to stroke the Greek pussycat and allow it to have power over the mouse RoM.
I have had a gutful of US, neo fascism at its best.
 
I think the world has Greece by the balls.
Unfortunately nobody wants to see the house of cards falling down. Ultimately an inefficient country does not deserve to be subsidised and that will be the natural outcome.
 
BBC Under Fire for Removing Video of Papandreou Shoe Incident:saddam:

http://macedoniaonline.eu/content/view/16548/46/

Tuesday, 28 September 2010

The BBC has been accused of failing to support one of its best foreign correspondents after his report about a shoe being thrown at the Greek prime minister was temporarily removed from the BBC News website.

Malcolm Brabant, an award-winning BBC correspondent, filmed the shoe-throwing incident involving the Greek prime minister, George Papandreou, earlier this month.

The incident happened when Papandreou was visiting Solun, where approximately 20,000 protesters were demonstrating against his government's swingeing austerity cuts.

The BBC took the footage down from the website after what it falsely described as "supporters of the [Greek] government" complained about the video and made allegations about its authenticity?

The film was taken down despite, it is understood, protests by the reporter Brabant. After the BBC realized the Greek Govt via its controlled media (To Vima) had lied, it put the video back online.

Colleagues of Brabant claimed that the fact the BBC took the footage down was seized upon by Greek government supporters and some of the country's media, who then publicly questioned Brabant's reputation. A strange anonymous opinion piece in the Greek pro Government daily newspaper To Vima – The Tribune – alleged: "There are more than a few people who consider that Mr Brabant, since he sank lower than the worst reporter on a cheap tabloid in his country, should not only apologise, but ask himself if he can continue to portray the serious correspondent in Athens."

This was a bizarre attack by To Vima on Brabant's character and work, all in order to protect 'Greece's image' in the world. The misleading opinionated article seemed to have backfired for Athens.

The BBC World News editor, Jon Williams, went on Greek television to defend Brabant, who has won the Sony reporter of the year award for coverage of the siege of Sarajevo and an Amnesty International prize for coverage of the Russian bombardment of Grozny in Chechnya.

Some of the BBC's foreign correspondents are understood to be concerned about the precedent of removing the report from the corporation's news website and are supporting Brabant.

A friend of Brabant's said: "The BBC's spinelessness has done immense damage to his reputation in Greece, so much so that he may not be able to operate there any more. He is furious."

One BBC News insider added: "'It looks as though the footage should have never been taken off the website. It sounds like people within the Greek government thought they'd try and divert attention."

A BBC spokesman said: "The shoe incident was covered as part of the BBC News Online article throughout the weekend. There were questions about the video showing the incident so the page featuring the clip was taken down, but it is now back up on the website given it is clear to us that the allegations were unfounded."

Brabant declined to comment.
 
If anything, this should result in the BBC et al, actually reviewing material, researching and validating their reports, so that there are no future knee-jerk reactions like this.

Though more importantly, it will mean the 'believability' and credibility of the Greek lobby groups will be put into question and the Greeks may not have their way with the media as they have to date.

Or one can only hope...
 
The European crisis gets quietly worse

Edward Hugh has a must-read overview of the euro crisis as it stands right now: not nearly as panicked as when everybody was concentrated on Greece back in May, yet in many ways worse than that.

Greece still seems certain to default sooner or later, and its bonds are trading at levels very near to those seen in May. Spain has improved a bit — but that tiny improvement seems to have been accompanied by a significant rise in complacency on the part of the government, so it’s unlikely to last long. And both Ireland and Portugal have deteriorated significantly.

Ireland’s debt is trading at worse levels than ever before, its economy is still in recession, and its banking system is a mess; in Portugal, the public deficit is likely to reach 9% of GDP this year, and the country’s debt spreads are also looking distressingly similar to Greece circa April 2010.


Writes Hugh:

Like former US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson before them, Europe’s leaders, having armed their bazooka may soon need to fire it…

The EuroArea countries could be likened to a group of 16 Alpine climbers scaling the Matterhorn who find themselves tightly roped together in appalling weather conditions. One of the climbers – Greece – has lost his footing and slipped over the edge of a dangerous precipice. As things stand, the other 15 can easily take the strain of holding him dangling there, however uncomfortable it may be for them, but they cannot quite manage to pull their colleague back up again. So, as the day advances, others, wearied by all the effort required, start themselves to slide.



What’s certain is that if you’re going to fire your bazooka anyway, it’s better to fire it earlier rather than later: the cost of a bailout always rises the longer it’s delayed. So why are the ECB’s bond purchases dwindling, and why is the much-vaunted European Financial Stability Facility still surrounded by so many questions? Yves Smith quotes the FT’s Wolfgang Munchau with some worrying math on that front: essentially, the EFSF won’t be able to lend cheap money to struggling countries at all.

In other words, the Eurozone’s bazooka might turn out to be even less effective than Paulson’s was. And if that’s the case, there’s no point in throwing good money after bad at all: it might be easier and cheaper just to slice that Alpine rope at a strategic point and sacrifice a weaker member or two for the sake of keeping everybody else safe.

Of course, slicing the rope would be easier if and when one of the peripheral countries actually wanted to do so — to attempt their own competitive devaluation in the global currency war. The stricter that the Germans are about the conditionality attached to new funds, the likelier that’s going to become.

In any crisis, there comes a point where it’s easier to let things fall apart than it is to keep things together. Given how fractious the European project has always been, and given that the generation of politicians who staked their careers on the European Union has now completely retired from the scene, a breakup would seem to be an inevitability at this point. The only question is when it will happen, and who will go first.


http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/09/28/the-european-crisis-gets-quietly-worse/
 
Irish government bailed out two more banks for $69 billion and this will make Ireland`s deficit value comparable with Greece, more than 132% of her GDP. Analysts expects Ireland to demand urgent help from IMF and EU. So, after Greece, it looks like Germans will have to fund Ireland too.



Ireland: At economic "ground zero"

After the binge of the "Celtic Tiger" years, Ireland has been jolted awake with the mother of all hangovers, an empty wallet and a horrendous bill.

On Thursday the government shocked a bewildered nation with the disclosure that the final cost of bailing out the Irish banks could rise to 50 billion euros ($69 billion). This is much more than previously admitted, and the impact on the country and the population of nearly 5 million has quickly became apparent.

The bailout will cost every man, woman and child in the republic 10,000 euros. Ireland will have to endure savage cuts in expenditure. There will be hair-shirt budgets for at least four years. And the Emerald Isle, warned the European Union, can now no longer remain a low-tax economy.

Finance Minister Brian Lenihan agreed the figures were “horrendous," but said they "can be managed over a 10-year period.”

The reaction of the media in Dublin and the world’s financial capitals was pretty uniform: Ireland’s Celtic Tiger is dead.

The Daily Star in Dublin splashed a cover picture of a tombstone with the inscription “Ireland R.I.P.” The Guardian in England ran a headline “Ireland Busted.” The Wall Street Journal said convulsions in Dublin were adding to concerns that Ireland may go the way of Greece and have to be rescued by the International Monetary Fund.

International approval of Ireland's handling of the crisis is critical for the demoralized and unstable Irish coalition government of Taoiseach (prime minister) Brian Cowen. It must reassure the financial markets that it can manage the country's spiraling debt costs.

Lenihan seems for the moment to have succeeded in what the Financial Times conceded was at least “a step — a small one, and not before time — towards solving Ireland's banking crisis.” In the meantime, like an erring customer groveling before a bank manager, the government has had to promise not to borrow any more money just now; the exchequer will not seek any more emergency funding from international lenders until next year.

The calamity in Ireland is the result of reckless lending by its banks during a boom that ended in 2007, and which, as property prices plunge, has become one of the biggest busts in history.

The cost of winding down Anglo Irish bank alone is estimated at 34 billion euros. Its directors lent outrageous sums to developers to buy sites and acquire properties that in many cases have become entirely worthless.

Even more shocking for a country where the banks were seen as solid pillars of the national infrastructure, one of the two biggest financial institutions, Allied Irish Banks, was practically nationalized with an injection of 3 billion euros and the brusque removal of its chairman and managing director on Thursday.

Lenihan, who two years ago estimated that the Anglo Irish Bank bailout would cost only 4.5 billion euros, claimed he was bringing closure to the “nightmare the government has had to live with, the Irish people have had to live with, and I have had to live with, since September 2008.”

Meanwhile, the deficit for this year will be 32 percent of gross domestic product, 10 times the limit set for member countries by the EU.

Cowen admitted that the Irish people were “rightly angry” at having to bear the burden of the profligate spending by bankers and developers, encouraged by cronyism at the highest levels. That anger was expressed on Tuesday when a protestor, 41-year-old Joe McNamara, drove a cement truck up against the gates of the Irish parliament building, Leinster House, in Dublin. His act gave rise to countless internet jokes about “concrete” measures to tackle the problem.

In the words of prominent businessman Denis O’Brien, Ireland is at “ground zero” and has to start rebuilding. He was speaking at a dinner in honor of Bill Clinton at University College Dublin on Thursday. At the end of a three-day visit, Clinton told an enraptured audience that Irish people were lucky — the lights came on at night, the toilets flushed, the government worked and they lived in homes they did not have to build themselves, whereas in some countries he visited people had none of these things. Ireland would be “just fine,” he said. It was about the only uplifting moment on Ireland’s “black Thursday.”

October 2, 2010

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/ireland/101002/irish-economy-crisis
 
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Very disappointing china coming to their aid.

China will buy government debt to Greece

http://www.makfax.com.mk/#117676

October 2, 2010 , 16:14
Athens

China plans to buy government debt to Greece, Greek writing business magazine Imerisia .

According to the newspaper , this will be formally specified after visiting Athens, the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Dzhibao .

Prime Minister 's visit will show Beijing's conviction that Athens will successfully deal with current problems " with the economic crisis, noted in the text.

restructuring taking long-term loans from May last year after clashing with the inability to pay the loans with reasonable interest, lack of confidence of investors.

China has recently become a major buyer of bonds and other European countries Unija.
 
well frank spain is going to be next & we are all waiting for the domino effect when the whole eu will come down completely ruined & peniless.Golden oppurtunity for macedonia to wise up & not partake with these fools.Pick herself up & have connections with the right countries then maybe we can get some real prosperity.The Eu is one big place of misery.Sounds like hell
doesn't it full of doom & gloom.
 
EU: Greek 2006-09 deficit, debt data to be revised up

http://www.idividi.com.mk/English/World/631201/index.html

Brussels, 6 October 2010 (MIA) - Greek budget deficit and public debt figures will be revised up for 2006-2009, following audits of the crisis-hit country by the European Union's statistical office, the European Commission said on Wednesday.

"Whether it will be a large increase or moderate one, I cannot say. There will be a clear upward revision," Commission spokesman Amadeu Altafaj told a daily news briefing.

The EU and the International Monetary Fund agreed to a 110 billion euro bailout plan for Greece in May after its ballooning budget deficit brought the euro zone to the brink of a sovereign debt crisis.

A senior Greek official said the impact of the revision on this year's budget deficit would be small.

Greece aims to slash this year's budget deficit to 7.8 percent of gross domestic product from 13.8 percent in 2009, based on its draft 2011 budget unveiled on Monday.

Next year it wants to shrink the budget hole to 7.0 percent, below a 7.6 percent target under an IMF/EU bailout plan.

Altafaj said it was too early to discuss the implications of the revisions for this year's fiscal gap.

He added that the revision of the Greek figures would come this month after several probes by Eurostat. The statistical office's powers were beefed up this year after Greece effectively admitted it had provided faulty statistics.

"In April 2010, Eurostat expressed reservations about the quality of data reported by Greece. Since then Eurostat has undertaken several investigations," he said.

Altafaj said some doubts remained after the probes, so EU Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn had ordered the expansion of Eurostat's team in Greece.

"Commissioner Rehn instructed Eurostat to reinforce its resources on the ground in Greece for the urgent task of clarifying Greek national accounts. No stone should be left unturned," Altafaj said.

Asked whether the terms of the IMF/EU bailout could be changed due to the planned revision, Altafaj said: "It would be premature to talk about implications.
 
Greece Default Likely Over Three Years, El-Erian Says

Greece Default Likely Over Three Years, El-Erian Says

Greece Default Likely Over Three Years, El-Erian Says
ctober 26, 2010, 12:03 PM EDT
(Adds Papandreou and Green comments on election outlook from seventh paragraph, closes prices.)

Oct. 26 (Bloomberg) -- Greece is likely to default over the next three years because budget-cutting won’t be enough to reduce the nation’s debt burden, Pacific Investment Management Co. Chief Executive Officer Mohamed A. El-Erian said.

It’s in Greece’s interest to default “as long as you can contain the contagion to other countries and it is done through orderly restructuring and repricing to retain competitiveness,” El-Erian said at a conference sponsored by the Economist magazine in New York yesterday. Like Latin America’s “lost decade” in the 1980s, “the alternative doesn’t promise growth and employment generation,” he said.

The extra yield, or spread, investors demand to hold Greek debt instead of similar-maturity German bonds jumped to a two- week high today. The European Union and International Monetary Fund approved a 110 billion-euro ($153 billion) aid package on May 2 in exchange for Greece agreeing to cut public-sector wages and pensions and raise taxes on fuel, alcohol and cigarettes.

“Greek bonds have been under pressure since El-Erian’s comments,” said Orlando Green, assistant director of capital- markets strategy at Credit Agricole Corporate & Investment Bank in London. “The near-term picture doesn’t look so bad for Greece, but it’s a long journey ahead.”

Greek bonds slid today, pushing the 10-year yield up 31 basis points to 9.66 percent at 5 p.m. in London, the highest since Oct. 8.

Investors demand 716 basis points, or 7.2 percent, more yield to hold 10-year Greek bonds than they do to hold benchmark German bunds. That’s also the widest spread since Oct. 8.

Election ‘Nervousness’

Prime Minister George Papandreou urged Greeks to vote for his ruling party and its reforms in local elections next month, saying that while he didn’t plan to call early national elections, “a decision by the Greek people” would be needed if the government found itself unable to push through changes.

“There may be some nervousness ahead of the elections” weighing on Greek debt today, Green said.

Europe’s sovereign-debt crisis erupted at the end of 2009 after Greece’s newly elected socialist government said the budget deficit was twice as big as the previous administration disclosed. Irish, Portuguese and Spanish bonds subsequently slumped on concern that Greece’s crisis would be followed by other fiscal problems on Europe’s periphery.

The Bank of Greece today said the nation must push ahead with its deficit-reduction plan. “Fiscal consolidation must now move at a much faster pace, with drastic limitation in public- sector waste,” the central bank said in an e-mailed report.

‘Heroic’ Target

Papandreou has promised austerity measures amounting to 11 percent of gross domestic product, according to IMF data.

“I have never seen an 11 percent adjustment on the fiscal side being delivered” under the current program’s assumptions, said El-Erian, who worked at the IMF for 15 years. “Eleven percent is heroic.”

Credit-default swaps protecting Greek government bonds for five years cost 668.5 basis points, according to CMA in London today. Swap prices surged before the May rescue plan and had eased since then, suggesting Papandreou’s austerity measures had bought the country time to reduce a budget deficit that’s more than four times the European Union’s limit.

The EU estimated Greece’s 2009 deficit at 13.6 percent of gross domestic product, the bloc’s highest after Ireland, and projects a shortfall this year of 7.8 percent of GDP.

“The fiscal adjustment that Greece needs to do is unprecedented,” Giada Giani, senior European economist at Citigroup Inc., said at a conference in Brussels today. “There is a limit to the amount of fiscal tightening a country can bear and support without the tightening becoming self-defeating, so detrimental for economic growth that it doesn’t really deliver an improvement.”

i
 
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