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    (1) The national-ethnic and cultural-linguistic identity of the Macedonian people is historically Macedonian, and derives its character from the native, indigenous and geographic homeland of the Macedonians, which is called Macedonia. To ensure that their human rights, integrity and heritage are appropriately respected, the only nouns and adjectives acceptable when reference is made to the above character and identity markers is Macedon, Macedonia, Macedonian and Macedonians.

    (2) The nation-state of the Macedonian people is the Republic of Macedonia, and is to be referred to by this official title so long as the 'republic' prefix is consistently applied to other states. Alternative references are the Macedonian Republic, or simply, Macedonia.

    (3) The 'ethnic' prefix is only acceptable for Macedonians in cases where differentiation is specifically required - so long as it is in context and consistent where it concerns its application to other ethnic groups.

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  • Macedonian Cause

    The Macedonian Truth Organisation calls on God in Heaven to protect, bless and guide the endeavour it is committing to undertake, and that is to work towards:

    Securing Macedonia as a free, independent and democratic republic in which sovereignty lies with the Macedonian citizens; as the nation-state of the Macedonian people in which they can preserve their culture, language and identity; as a state in which the Macedonian language and culture form the basis of public life and act as important unifying elements of Macedonian society; as the home of all its citizens to which it guarantees and obliges their inalienable natural rights and corresponding responsibilities;

    The acknowledgment as self-evident and irrefutable the existence of the:

    1) Indigenous, ethnonational name of Macedonia;
    2) Macedonian people, language and identity;
    3) Macedonian culture, symbols and folklore;
    4) Macedonian ancestry, heritage and history in its entirety; and
    5) Macedonian Orthodox Church;

    Securing recognition by the International Community of the tragedies endured by the Macedonian people, of the division of Macedonia with the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest on August 10, 1913, and the genocide committed against the Macedonian people at the hands of the Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian states and their respective churches during the 19th and 20th centuries;

    Ensuring that the Interim Accord is declared ‘null and void’ and that all constitutional provisions, acts, commitments, agreements, legislation, regulations, policies or programs emanating from, supporting or consequential to the Interim Accord are also declared ‘null and void’, including the use of any symbols and the completion of any acts imposed by, or originating from, the Interim Accord.

    Ensuring that the Framework Agreement is abolished and that all constitutional provisions, acts, commitments, agreements, legislation, regulations, policies and programs emanating from, supporting or consequential to the Framework Agreement are also abolished and replaced by a framework of constitutional and statutory law based on inalienable natural rights and corresponding responsibilities and universally codified human rights mechanisms.

    Securing the abolishment of any existing constitutional provisions, acts, agreements, legislation, regulations, policies and programs that discriminate against the Macedonian people, in any international organisation or any of the countries of the International Community where such constitutional provisions, acts, agreements, legislation, regulations, policies and programs exist, and thereby ensuring the freedom for Macedonians to exercise their inalienable natural rights and fulfil their corresponding responsibilities, and practice their culture, language and religious faiths in all the countries of the International Community without hindrance;

    The empowerment of Macedonians to undertake a moral revolution and to instil and/or reinvigorate within themselves a deep-rooted national, cultural, linguistic and historical dignity and a commitment to the exercise of freedom based on inalienable natural rights and corresponding responsibilities;

    The recognition of the Macedonian minorities in the neighbouring states of Macedonia as well as the respect for the inalienable rights and freedoms of the Macedonian minorities, as provided for by natural law and as codified by the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other universally codified human rights mechanisms;

    The full and unreserved respect of, and the support for, the rights of all people of non-Macedonian descent living in Macedonia and around the world, who share a reciprocal full and unreserved respect for the Macedonian people, their homeland and their state;

    The cultural unification and solidarity of the Macedonian people living in all parts of historical Macedonia and adjacent territories, as well as Macedonians throughout the world;

    The unity of all Macedonians on the principles, objectives and achievement of the Macedonian cause as defined by this declaration.

Macedonia’s Crisis has Become Existential

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-s-crisis-has-become-existential-03-06-2017

Macedonia’s Crisis has Become Existential

The long-running political crisis in the divided Balkan country has entered a new and more dangerous phase.

Macedonia’s long-running political dispute has just taken a dramatic turn for the worse, transforming a crisis of corruption and governance into a burgeoning crisis of state.

President Gjorge Ivanov on Wednesday last week refused to give a governing mandate to a diverse coalition of political parties whose stated objective is an enhanced status for Macedonia’s large Albanian minority.

In the process, Ivanov has temporarily - and perhaps more permanently - shut Albanians out of the political process, with potentially serious consequences.

The backdrop to this move was a set of EU-sponsored elections in December, which were supposed to bring a two-year political crisis to an end.

The idea was to restore the legitimacy of government after revelations of gross corruption in the main party of government, VMRO-DPMNE.

Either VMRO-DPMNE would gain a fresh democratic mandate or the opposition Social Democratic Party, SDSM, would be elected. Either outcome was supposed to put a full stop on matters.

However, neither VMRO-DPMNE nor the SDSM won enough seats to form a government - even in coalition with the main Albanian party, the Democratic Union for Integration, DUI, which lost much of its support because of its long association with VMRO-DPMNE.

Instead, the balance of power was held by two new Albanian parties, Besa and the Alliance for Albanians, which campaigned on a platform of enhanced rights for Albanians in what they argued was a state run primarily in the interests of its Macedonian majority.

Unable to form a government without the help of Besa and the Alliance for Albanians, the DUI turned for help to Albania’s prime minister, Edi Rama, who summoned the leaders of the various Albanian parties to a summit in Tirana.

What then emerged was a joint declaration, which set out their conditions for entry into government with either one of the main Macedonian parties.

This declaration was a radical document. It effectively demanded that Macedonia be redefined as a binational state comprised of two equal partners - Macedonians and Albanians - rather than as a Macedonian national state with a tolerated Albanian minority.

Its more innocuous demands included the right to proportional representation for Albanians in the institutions of government where their numbers fell short, especially the security services and the judiciary, and a proportional share of the budget revenues - in effect, a request for completion of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement.

More controversially, the declaration demanded the official use of Albanian everywhere in the country, not just the western part where Albanians predominate; a debate on revision of the flag, anthem and state symbols; Albanians’ involvement in a resolution of the dispute over Macedonia’s name with Greece [potentially implying abandonment of the name “Macedonia”]; and the adoption of a resolution in parliament condemning alleged genocide against Albanians in the early-20th century.

Unsurprisingly, these demands were anathema to the majority Macedonian population, which is engaged in a project of building a national state based on Slavic Orthodoxy, the Macedonian language and a purported lineage from ancient Macedonia – most graphically expressed in the rebuilding of Skopje at huge expense in a mock-classical style.

Gulf too wide to bridge

This inevitably led to complications in forming a government. At first the Albanians, led by the DUI, began negotiations with VMRO-DPMNE, making the issue of language rights a sine qua non.

When negotiations failed, the Albanian parties then turned to the SDSM, which insisted on no changes to the constitution. Eventually, however, it agreed to a new law on language and notified the president that it had the necessary signatures to form a majority government.

No sooner had this happened than thousands of ethnic Macedonians took to the streets to decry what they saw as a takeover of the Macedonian state by ethnic Albanians, organised by Tirana and supported by treacherous politicians from the SDSM, who were happy to sell out the country for the sake of power.

There is some uncertainty about the identity of these protestors. Many are undoubtedly members and clients of VMRO-DPMNE, which desperately wants to prevent the formation of an SDSM-led government and the party’s relegation to the opposition.

However, the main group organising the protests, the Civic Initiative for a United Macedonia, denies links with VMRO-DPMNE and is likely to have a wider constituency. A poll in January suggested that 90 per cent of ethnic Macedonians are opposed to a new language law, and the demonstrations undoubtedly take their strength from a broader nationalist backlash.

This was the context in which President Ivanov, a moderate nationalist who is close to VMRO-DPMNE, refused to grant a mandate to the new SDSM-led government. On Wednesday last week, he emphasised both the risk to Macedonia’s integrity of recasting the country as a binational state, and the violation of sovereignty implicit in accepting a political platform which was, he claimed, scripted by a foreign government.

In doing so, however, he has plunged Macedonia into a new and more dangerous phase of its long-running political crisis.

Only hope is that Albanians remain calm

What happens next is an open question. In a best-case scenario, Western diplomats succeed in pressurising the key actors to compromise, the Albanian parties drop their demands for a binational state, at least for now, and Ivanov recognises the basic legitimacy of the Albanians’ grievances.

In short order, Ivanov would then look for some arrangement that allowed a continuation of inter-ethnic power-sharing on which Albanians’ stake in the country depends.

In due course, he would then initiate a dialogue between Macedonians and Albanians about forging a more equitable state. That way, he could transform what is currently an ultimatum by the Albanian parties into a formal negotiating process with give and take on both sides.

However, the immediate prospects of a breakthrough are limited. In his statement, Ivanov stated that he would not bargain away Macedonia’s “sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence”.

At the same time, there is no immediate hope of the Albanians backing down. Even if the DUI could be persuaded to pursue a graduated approach, the more ideological Besa and the Alliance for Albanians are committed to delivering the key elements of the joint declaration of the Albanian parties.

Meanwhile, the leverage of outside actors to shape internal outcomes is waning, particularly among VMRO-DPMNE and its supporters who have accused Western diplomats of gross interference in Macedonia’s internal affairs.

If this scenario proves elusive, then Macedonia is probably looking at fresh parliamentary elections in a few months’ time when the country holds scheduled local elections.

Unfortunately, however, these may not provide much remedy. Opinion polls point to a similar outcome to last December’s ballot, while new elections will do nothing to overcome the impasse in which Albanians are conditioning their participation in government on demands that are unacceptable to most Macedonians.

This raises the possibility of a much more dangerous scenario in which VMRO-DPMNE and Ivanov, backed by Macedonian conservatives at home and Russia abroad, effectively exclude Albanians from government on an indefinite basis as a means of thwarting their demands.

The question then is how Albanians would respond. Ideally, a combination of international and domestic political pressure would mean that matters were eventually resolved and the Albanians did not do anything too drastic in the meantime.

But if the impasse dragged on, the risk is that Albanians would switch their focus from seeking equal partnership with Macedonians to creating a devolved Albanian entity in the west of the country, which Albanians could run in their own interests.

With some variations, this would amount to a repeat of the circumstances that led to civil conflict in 2001 when the Macedonian army sought to wrest control of territory from Albanians who had repudiated the authority of the central government.

Worse still, this drama would play out at time when tensions between Serbs and Albanians in neighbouring Kosovo are running high. Only a radical optimist would bet on two parallel disputes over power and territory between Albanians and their Slavic neighbours not, in some way, joining up.

Danger of sliding into an abyss

The immediate issue is who makes the next move. The DUI’s leader last week urged Albanians not to take any steps that might transform a “systematic crisis into an ethnic conflict” and Besa has also urged “restraint and caution”. Both can no doubt foresee a situation in which hasty Albanian action provokes a hostile reaction from angry Macedonians.

In the meantime, VMRO-DPMNE and Macedonian nationalists remain on the streets, pursuing tactics that could well bring about the very thing they want avoid - a de facto partition of the Macedonian state.

Two years on from the first revelations of corruption, Macedonia’s political crisis has now become existential in nature. The best hope for stability is the willingness of local parties to step back from the brink and avoid a potentially violent escalation.

But with Western leverage limited, and the country fractured by the impact of the political crisis, there are no guarantees of a happy outcome. Policymakers everywhere should be planning for worse to come.

Timothy Less is the director of the Nova Europa political risk consultancy and a former British diplomat in Macedonia.
 
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