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    The empowerment of Macedonians to undertake a moral revolution and to instil and/or reinvigorate within themselves a deep-rooted national, cultural, linguistic and historical dignity and a commitment to the exercise of freedom based on inalienable natural rights and corresponding responsibilities;

    The recognition of the Macedonian minorities in the neighbouring states of Macedonia as well as the respect for the inalienable rights and freedoms of the Macedonian minorities, as provided for by natural law and as codified by the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other universally codified human rights mechanisms;

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WikiLeaks Threads

they been caught out & they know it a typical denial response.
Thanks for your efforts wkkileaks 86.
 
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Here is one about Branko:

https://www.balkanleaks.eu/en/09skopje201.html

date: 5/6/2009 11:19
refid: 09SKOPJE201
origin: Embassy Skopje
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08SKOPJE140|08SKOPJE327|08SKOPJE512|08SKOPJE538|08SKOPJE696
header:
VZCZCXRO7481
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0201/01 1261119
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061119Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8212
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0518
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000201

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, MK
SUBJECT: REFLECTING ON BRANKO CRVENKOVSKI'S PRESIDENCY

REF: A. 08 SKOPJE 512
B. 08 SKOPJE 140
C. 08 SKOPJE 696
D. 08 SKOPJE 327
E. 08 SKOPJE 538

Classified By: Ambassador Reeker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: As his five-year Presidential term comes
to an end May 12, Branko Crvenkovski prepares himself for
yet another political transition --this time returning to
resurrect his opposition Social Democrats (SDSM), in shambles
following devastating losses in 2008 parliamentary and 2009
municipal and presidential elections. Not deterred by the
substantial work ahead, Crvenkovski believes time is on his
side as he rebuilds the party and continues to be a thorn in
the side of PM Gruevski. His presidency was marked by a
genuine dislike between the two and a tendency for each to
score-keep rather than unite to advance Macedonia,s goals.
The Embassy has enjoyed a good relationship with Crvenkovski,
who has proven generally more reasonable, reliable and
sophisticated than Gruevski, especially in strategic thinking
on international relations. But Crvenkovski is also a
ruthless politician who has not hesitated to oppose positive
steps (passage of a language law, recognition of Kosovo) in
an effort to score points with the ethnic Macedonian
community. He is self-promoting and a chameleon who
reinvented himself with the changing environment. The term
of his successor, politically-inexperienced professor Gjorge
Ivanov, will likely be markedly different than his own.
Handpicked by Gruevski as VMRO-DPMNE,s candidate, Ivanov is
unlikely to be a strong independent voice. Ivanov is also
unlikely to make the same impression that Crvenkovski did --
of an experienced politician with a good sense of how the
world works. End Summary.

His Presidency
-------------
2. (C) Crvenkovski,s dislike for and opposition to the
policies of PM Gruevski was never kept out of the public eye.
Daily battles in the media marked their relationship, which
at times became so tense that they would not be in the same
room together. They presented a divided front which made
progress on Euro-Atlantic integration exceedingly difficult.
Crvenkovski believes that Macedonian policy should be a
"three-legged stool" -- inter-ethnic issues, the economy, and
international engagement; he says openly that Gruevski has
failed in all three. Gruevski, always over-sensitive to
criticism, has long been intimidated by Crvenkovski -- a fact
that Crvenkovski knew well and used to his advantage.

3. (SBU) Though the office of the Presidency is
constitutionally much less powerful than that of the PM,
Crvenkovski used his limited powers strategically. Most
notably, he ended a standoff and secured the return to
Parliament of boycotting SDSM and e-Albanian party DPA in
August 2008 (reftel A) by pardoning SDSM leader Zoran Zaev
and refusing to sign the laws adopted under emergency
procedures in the absence of the opposition. Though the
refusal to sign the laws was only a ceremonial veto (a second
parliamentary vote passed them with ease and forced
Crvenkovski,s signature), he was able to mark his scorecard
with a strategic win on that one.

Crvenkovski on the Name Dispute and Euro-Atlantic Integration
-----------------------------------
4. (C) President Crvenkovski generally thought more
strategically about the name issue than PM Gruevski, heeding
our advice and encouraging Gruevski not to say "no" to Nimetz
proposals -- even what he viewed as "the worst Nimetz had
ever tabled" in February 2008 (reftel B), instead calling on
the PM to highlight what was acceptable in the proposal.
Crvenkovski told us on several occasions that he did not
think Gruevski was serious about wanting to resolve the name
dispute, and instead tried to "freeze it," especially with a
return to the non-starter "double name formula" (one name for
relations with Greece, the constitutional name for everyone
else) in response to the October 2008 Nimetz proposal.
Shocked and disappointed by the government,s 2007 renaming
of Skopje airport to "Aleksandar the Great Airport"
(Crvenkovski told the Ambassador that when he got wind of it
he immediately inquired of FM Milososki, who initially also
expressed shock. After Milososki discovered Gruevski had
personally ordered the name change, Milososki changed his
tune and said he supported it). Crvenkovski also questioned
the utility of the suit against Greece in the ICJ for
violating the 1995 Interim Accord (reftel C). Crvenkovski

SKOPJE 00000201 002 OF 003


saw the government actions through a prism that Gruevski
seemingly never used -- that of whether it would provoke
Greece unnecessarily or hinder progress in the name
negotiations.

5. (SBU) Crvenkovski also issued a stark warning on what he
views as Gruevski,s "we can make it without NATO" attitude,
warning that populism won,t get Macedonia what NATO and EU
integration will. In his December State of the Republic
address, Crvenkovski said "by using populism and misusing
patriotic feelings of the citizens, by dividing into patriots
and traitors, but creating the sense that we want to be in
NATO and the EU but we do not have to, and that the
Government has an alternative strategy for a comprehensive,
economic, democratic and social development of the country
outside of Euro-Atlantic structures we are setting the
foundation for a major historic defeat." He added, "in the
choice the Government is currently offering in Macedonia --
that someone either support its policies or be proclaimed a
traitor -- I voluntarily and with full responsibility decide
to remain on its list of traitors. And I have no doubt that
time will show what true patriotism is and who true patriots
are."

6. (C) While he views the PM as at the center of the
populist and, in his view, isolationist strategies, he also
sees FM Milososki as adding fuel to the fire. Crvenkovski
told the Ambassador privately that while he thinks Milososki
is "brighter than Gruevski," he,s been amazed and
disappointed at the Foreign Minister's tendency to
"out-Gruevski Gruevski" with isolationist or reactionary
stances.

His View of the Problems Ahead
--------------------------
7. (C) Increasingly concerned about the economy,
Crvenkovski thinks that the PM and VMRO-DPMNE Government are
hiding their heads in the sand and ignoring the looming
crisis. Crvenkovski views the Government as incapable of
attracting foreign investment and compounding the problem
with irresponsible fiscal policy, citing the millions spent
on monuments and the Government's continued insistence to
fund construction of an Orthodox church on Skopje's main
square. At a recent dinner, President Crvenkovski also told
the Ambassador privately that he believes Gruevski is also
"milking the budget" to his own benefit through two streams
-- (1) his cousins the Mijalkov brothers, Sasho (Director of
Security of Counterintelligence) and Vladimir (Advisor to the
Head of Customs Vanco Kargov); and 2) DPM Zoran Stavreski and
Vlatko Cingoski, President of the state-owned electricity
producer ELEM.

8. (C) Inter-ethnic issues, in Crvenkovski,s view, have
also been "dangerously neglected" by PM Gruevski. He
believes the PM and Government did not do enough ahead of
June 2008 parliamentary elections to stop the rising
intra-Albanian violence, saying that Gruevski "started the
gladiator battle" between rival parties DPA and DUI (reftel
D) by promising each a place in the future governing
coalition. While Crvenkovski is highly critical of the PM,s
dismissive handling of ethnic Albanian issues, he has not
taken on a single ethnic Albanian in his own cabinet. His
talk may be more enlightened than his actions on inter-ethnic
issues. As noted, his party has not joined VMRO in moving on
key issues for the ethnic Albanian community (language law,
Kosovo recognition).

His Successor
------------
9. (C) Gjorge Ivanov, Crvenkovski,s successor, due to take
office on May 12, brings no political experience and very
little charisma or personal presence to the table. He is an
academic also lacking in experience with foreign
interlocutors. Crvenkovski said Ivanov "doesn't know what
he,s in for." Ahead of the presidential elections, Ivanov
rarely met with anyone in the international community without
bringing DPM (and his former student) Ivica Bocevski with
him. The pattern has remained the same since he has become
President-elect. In a post-election congratulatory meeting
with the Ambassador, Ivanov, accompanied by Bocevski, spoke
only of his plans to start a new inaugural tradition,
bringing in presidents of neighboring countries. In an
awkward meeting, Ivanov could not be coaxed to speak of
anything remotely substantive, and only nodded when the
Ambassador suggested he reach out to those who did not vote
for him, including the ethnic Albanian community, and to
include ethnic minorities in his cabinet.

SKOPJE 00000201 003 OF 003



What he Returns To
------------------
10. (C) Politically, Crvenkovski returns to a party in
shambles, with SDSM suffering staggering losses in 2008
parliamentary and 2009 municipal and presidential elections.
In addition to its losses at the ballot box, SDSM faces a
substantial debt of nearly 2 million Euros. Undeterred,
Crvenkovski spoke at a March dinner with the Ambassador of
plans to resurrect the party. He envisions creating a
"shadow government" and plans for the process to take nearly
a year, beginning with a party congress on May 24 where he
expects to be re-elected as President of the party.
Crvenkovski recently told the Ambassador that he will bring
in experts and consultants in an effort to jump-start the
party reorganization. Interim SDSM President Zoran Zaev,
recently re-elected Mayor of Strumica in one of SDSM,s very
few mayoral wins, will not challenge Crvenkovski for the
party presidency, and it is not clear what role he or other
current SDSM leaders will play following the re-shuffle.
Crvenkovski blames Zaev and other SDSM leaders for the state
of the party, saying the party,s massive defeat in 2008
parliamentary elections was due to its lost identity, as the
party appeared "even more nationalistic than Gruevski,s
VMRO-DPMNE" and flip-flopped on key issues such as the name
issue, and support for the Ohrid Framework Agreement (reftel
E). Despite the challenges ahead of SDSM, PM Gruevski has
told the Ambassador that he sees Crvenkovski as formidable
opposition.

11. (C) Personally, Crvenkovski, his wife and two teenaged
children return to a flat of only 60 square meters, no doubt
a bit of a shock to the system after life in the Presidential
residence (and earlier, the Prime Ministerial quarters). His
love of fine whiskey, basketball, and political intrigue may
provide some distraction. Crvenkovski might also be
distracted by legal battles, as the Government seems to
increasingly wield the threat of charges/arrests against its
political opponents. Crvenkovski personally claims not to be
concerned about possible charges against him.

12. (C) Comment: Crvenkovski has been a key player since
(and before) Macedonia's independence. He will continue to
be an important force in Macedonian politics, and presents
possibly the only chance for SDSM to regain its relevance.
If SDSM rises from the ashes, we expect that Euro-Atlantic
integration will remain the centerpiece of the party,s
platform, and that the party,s approach to Greece and the
name dispute would be more strategically intelligible and
less intentionally provocative than VMRO's. That said, the
road to relevance ahead for Crvenkovski and his party is a
tough one -- at the local level where SDSM holds only 7
mayoral seats to VMRO,s 56, and at the national level where
the party lost nearly 2 to 1 to VMRO in the 2008
Parliamentary race and in the recent Presidential election.
But Crvenkovski, an experienced politician and strategist, is
determined to succeed and has the track record to back it up.
REEKER

Plus these 3 articles which talk about the previous cables:

http://www.focus-fen.net/index.php?id=n251440
http://www.focus-fen.net/index.php?id=n251307

http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargem...ing-climate-fear-leaked-us-cables-news-505305

No problem guys. When I see more I will post it here for you to see.
 
Great!

Now, I suspect at some point in time the name UMD will surface in Wikileaks as well because of secret talks with people like Crvenkovski, Reeker and Matthew Nimetz. People, choose politics never the other way around!

Once, again one would be hard pressed to find ANY damaging leaks on George Soros for a very good reason - selective leaks he owns (CIA) and mainly anti US Democrat government.

A. Mason
 
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MK that would be good if had it on the umd.Watch out for Bukhefal he just love the umd
(to death)

lol seriously?

Come on son, did you even read the posts? Where have you read that I love the UMD (to death) ?

This post and your responds are just so pointless, I wont even bother answering them anymore.

Ignorance is nice. Hating is a nice thing too.

Have a nice day :clap:
 
bukefal come on you were saying we hated the umd (we presumed you loved the umd)
What made you change your mind all of a sudden ?? is it the wikileaks ?or MK.
Ps now that i heard that i will have a nice day!!!
You have one as well!:rockon::45:
 
From the above extracts, you would have to say Reeker is abundantly Pro SDSM who are abundantly anti-Macedonian. Which means USA is anti-Macedonian.

Please UMD if you have a pinch of a lobbyist's arsehole, please work on your backyard and try to find out why the USA is hellbent on destroying Macedonia. Reconcile that with Australia simply calling Macedonia a name which stupid Macedonians wanted to be called for UN purposes. Which is worse?
 
From the above extracts, you would have to say Reeker is abundantly Pro SDSM who are abundantly anti-Macedonian. Which means USA is anti-Macedonian.

Please UMD if you have a pinch of a lobbyist's arsehole, please work on your backyard and try to find out why the USA is hellbent on destroying Macedonia. Reconcile that with Australia simply calling Macedonia a name which stupid Macedonians wanted to be called for UN purposes. Which is worse?
Shame, on the UMD and that drunken asshole Reeker, golem rezil and he must be exterminated.
 
I read a very interesting article about a cable dealing with Ali Ahmeti's views:

“There are more churches and mosques in Macedonia than believers,” Ahmeti told Reeker adding that the Islamic Community's President, Sulejman Rexhepi, was everything but a believer. Ahmeti called the Islamic Community "God's bureaucracy" and said he did not support it.
 
Did a search through cablegate viewer today and found a few that I did not see before:

Only mentions Macedonia (talk about oil-gas pipeline):
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06SOFIA202&q=macedonia
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06SOFIA1481&q=macedonia
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06SOFIA1560&q=macedonia
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06SOFIA1691&q=macedonia
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08ATHENS262&q=macedonia

Visa program for Greece:
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09ATHENS685&q=macedonia

Bulgaria support (are the diplomats government contacts full of it when they say this?)
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=05SOFIA1987&q=macedonia
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06SOFIA579&q=macedonia (only a brief mention at the end)

Macedonian EU aspirations (reminds me of the donkey following the carrot in front of it):
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07STATE35309&q=macedonia

Greek-Macedonia relations (name issue etc.)
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08ATHENS469&q=macedonia
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09ATHENS657&q=macedonia
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10ATHENS77&q=macedonia
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07ATHENS559&q=macedonia
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08ATHENS678&q=macedonia

Greece-China (Oh now this is interesting!)
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08ATHENS1635&q=macedonia

¶10. (C) The Greeks clearly did not believe this show of support for China was reciprocated. Adamidis noted President Papoulias' discussion with Hu on the Macedonia name issue. He said Papoulias had told President Hu, "We support you on Taiwan, Tibet, and Market Economy Status, but we need your support on FYROM." Papoulias went on to note that Greece had been "furious" at China for being the first member of the UN Security Council to recognize "FYROM" by its constitutional name (1993). The Chinese reply was "We are going to accept any decision by the two parties for a mutually acceptable solution." The Chinese President had also warned Papoulias that if the Dalai Lama were permitted to visit Greece, it would have a "severe impact" on bilateral relations. Adding to this list, Adamidis mentioned with some disfavor as well that in the runup to the Olympics in China, the Chinese had agreed to have Greece help with security at the games but as the event approach, "they dumped us."

Highway built in Macedonia with EU (& thus Greek funds hah!)
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09ATHENS235&q=macedonia

(maybe they should worry about their own economy if the news of late is anything to go by)

Is Greece seriously scared of Macedonia?
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08ATHENS576&q=macedonia
¶3. (C) For his part, Deputy FonMin Valynakis demonstrated a certain amount of showmanship, handing Bryza a picture of the Macedonian PM laying a wreath on a map of an enlarged "united" Macedonia. He also read a quote from a 1944 Circular Airgram from then-Secretary of State Stettinius that characterized any talk of a "Macedonian nation or Fatherland" as "unjustified demagoguery" and a "possible cloak for aggressive intentions against Greece." Valynakis could not concede that Skopje had demonstrated flexibility in accepting Nimetz,s "Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)" proposal, discounting "parenthesis and dashes" as unacceptable. He urged the U.S. and others to send positive messages to Skopje for genuine compromise through UN auspices. He furthermore reiterated that Greece's strategic goal was to see Skopje integrated into the EU and NATO, but that Greece took the good neighborly relations criteria very seriously.

Last but not least:
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09SKOPJE411&q=macedonia

This was the cable where the Drogg made this quote a few days ago:

I read a very interesting article about a cable dealing with Ali Ahmeti's views:

“There are more churches and mosques in Macedonia than believers,” Ahmeti told Reeker adding that the Islamic Community's President, Sulejman Rexhepi, was everything but a believer. Ahmeti called the Islamic Community "God's bureaucracy" and said he did not support it.

I will make another post later today with newer items.
 
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More Greek-Macedonia relations re: Name issue
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08ATHENS896&q=macedonia
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08ATHENS1203&q=macedonia
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08USNATO265&q=macedonia

¶1. (C) Welcome to Athens. Your visit is an excellent opportunity to press Greece to show progress on TIP issues if it wishes to avoid a Tier-Two Watch-List rating. Your visit comes at a particularly delicate moment in U.S.-Greece relations. A NATO ally and EU member, Greece has been helpful in some areas, such as its support for our naval facility at Souda Bay, while also taking positions at odds with U.S. interests, such as moving closer to Russia on energy pipeline deals. Bilateral relations have been particularly difficult since Greece vetoed the Republic of Macedonia's NATO accession at the Bucharest Summit in April. You will face interlocutors who are reluctant to believe that U.S. criticism of Greece's TIP record is anything other than retribution for the Macedonia veto.

-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08ATHENS1294&q=macedonia

¶6. (C) Among the key issues likely to come up are the following: -- Macedonia: At the April NATO Summit, Greece blocked the invitation of Macedonia into the Alliance -- a top U.S. priority because of a lack of agreement on changing the country's name. We continue to urge both Athens and Skopje to work rapidly for a solution. Greek/Macedonian relations have been soured by a recent tart exchange of letters between Macedonian PM Gruevski and Greek PM Karamanlis on questions related to the "Macedonian minority" in Greece. Ultimately Athens is insisting on a solution that would: -- indicate that "Macedonia" is a broader region than the country in question (hence Greece's support for a geographic qualifier such as "Northern" or "Upper" before Macedonia), and -- be used broadly for all international use.

-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09ATHENS1623&q=macedonia

¶7. (C) PM Papandreou has launched an initiative calling for full integration of the Balkans into European institutions by 2014. He has reached out to his Macedonian counterpart, and the Greeks have consistently told us they are willing to compromise on the Macedonia name issue as long as the formula is consistent with the bipartisan agreement in Greece about how far they can go. Greek red lines include an insistence on "erga omnes" use internationally of a new name with a geographic modifier. This controversy remains emotionally and politically salient for many Greeks. We are pressing Greece to work to avoid a hard landing or "veto" of the opening of Macedonia's EU accession talks at the December 10 European Council meeting.

-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06ATHENS1491&q=macedonia

An interesting angle of how America wants to get other countries to recognize Kosovo ASAP (to piss off Serbia it seems):
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08PANAMA255&q=macedonia

I love the way this is written (USA#1 basically):
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08ATHENS874&q=macedonia

¶8. (C) COMMENT CONT.: As for the immediate problem of Greece joining the growing EU consensus on stiffening Iran sanctions, including designation of Bank Melli, Greece on just about all other issues has not been willing to buck EU consensus (the one exception is the Macedonia name issue, where it perceives its vital interests are at stake). We have put the Greeks on notice that they are falling behind the EU curve on Iran sanctions and that we are watching. We believe further discussion in Brussels highlighting Greece's increasing risk of isolation could have a positive impact. SPECKHARD

I will copy/paste a few more on a different post.
 
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Macedonia's Elections: Ruling Party Wins, Country Loses

http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08SKOPJE359&q=macedonia

SUMMARY --------- ¶1. (SBU) Macedonia's June 1 snap parliamentary elections resulted in an expected victory and absolute majority for the ruling VMRO party. Despite numerous international community (IC) and media appeals for free and fair elections in the run-up to Election Day (reftel), voting was marred by numerous incidents of gross election irregularities, including ballot-stuffing, voter intimidation, and violence that resulted in one fatality and several injured. While governing coalition partners VMRO and DPA labeled the elections "free and fair," opposition SDSM and DUI, and IC and local observers condemned the violence and intimidation, which included illegal detention of election observers. PM Gruevski has pledged to conduct reruns in all disputed areas, to punish all persons responsible for the violence, and to delay coalition talks until after free and fair reruns are held. End summary. UNSURPRISING ELECTION RESULTS ----------------------------- ¶2. (SBU) As expected, governing VMRO won an absolute majority of seats in Macedonia's June 1 early parliamentary elections, followed by its rival SDSM. Results for the two biggest eAlbanian parties, DUI and DPA, remain uncertain pending DUI appeals of the voting in two of the country's six electoral districts where there were widespread instances of fraud. Two smaller parties --eAlbanian party PDP and Macedonian Muslim party PEI-- may succeed in getting one MP seat each. With 98% of the ballots counted, the State Electoral Committee (SEC) has put overall voter turnout at 57.45% of all eligible voters. Using SEC figures, the following parties are expected to enter Parliament: VMRO -- 64 MP seats (479,219 votes) SDSM -- 28 MP seats (231,978 votes) DUI -- 14 MP seats (107,230 votes)* DPA -- 12 MP seats (100,569 votes)* PDP -- 1 MP seat (8,847 votes) PEI -- 1 MP seat (7,669 votes) *likely to change after reruns ELECTIONS MARRED BY VIOLENCE... ------------------------------- ¶3. (SBU) Early on the morning of June 1, in the village of Aracinovo near Skopje, police engaged in a firefight with DUI activists, resulting in one fatality and at least five wounded persons. While the police claimed they returned fire after a group of armed civilians shot at them from a house, DUI said the victims were on their way out of a polling station (PS) when the police opened fire. There also were reports of an additional casualty, who is in critical condition, after a shooting incident near DUI headquarters in Cair, a suburb of Skopje. ...INTIMIDATION, AND UNLAWFUL DETENTION ---------------------------------------- ¶4. (SBU) The Mission's election monitoring teams registered instances in which people were physically prevented from voting and were otherwise intimidated after talking to international observers. Around noon, armed DPA activists in the village of Poroj prevented a U.S. observer, her teammates, police, and SEC officials from leaving a polling station (PS) and threatening them with death if they attempt to leave. The incident occurred when SEC officials, accompanied by police, arrived to remove ballot boxes and close the polling station because DPA had ejected the municipal election board and replaced it entirely with DPA personnel. A DPA MP ended the incident with a negotiated "settlement," in which the captives were released if the SEC officials agreed to permit the ballot boxes to remain and the unaccredited DPA election board to continue to operate the PS. The DPA operatives also confiscated the weapons of the police on the scene. PM Gruevski told the Ambassador he SKOPJE 00000359 002 OF 003 would follow up to ensure prosecution of the perpetrators. ...OTHER IRREGULARITIES ------------------------ ¶5. (SBU) Signs of numerous election irregularities, especially in Electoral District 1 (Skopje area) and Election District 6 (northwestern Macedonia), started coming in as early as the opening of the polls at 7 a.m. on June 1. Irregularities reported included: massive ballot stuffing; ballot burning; destroying ballot boxes; use of weapons in close proximity to the PS; physical assaults on PS officials; and chasing observers out of a PS. By mid-afternoon, over 60 PSs had been closed or had suspended operations, and were deemed unsafe even for the police. Local election observation NGO MOST reported that 97 of its observers had been withdrawn for security reasons, or were prevented from doing their jobs in a number of PSs. In the rest of the country, there were reports of sporadic family voting, proxy voting, and other incidents, but the overall situation was much calmer. GOVERNING PARTNERS: "A VICTORY FOR MACEDONIA" --------------------------------------------- ¶6. (SBU) Hours after the polls closed, governing VMRO leader Gruevski said the elections were "an enormous victory" for the whole country. He added that there would be reruns in a limited number of places to ensure that "each and every MP is elected fairly." In a triumphalist speech, DPA's Thaci added that this was DPA's "sweetest victory" and rejected any need for reruns. (Note: Preliminary results point to a DUI victory, but Thaci insisted that DPA was the party that received more votes. End note). Despite independent observer assessments that Thaci's party was behind the majority of election irregularities throughout the day, Thaci blamed rival DUI as the main culprit. (Note: In a June 2 meeting with the Ambassador, Gruevski pledged that there will be no coalition talks until after reruns are completed in a free and fair manner in the next two weeks. End note) OPPOSITION: "THE PRICE IN HUMAN LIFE WAS TOO HIGH" --------------------------------------------- ----- ¶7. (SBU) Opposition SDSM leader Sekerinska congratulated VMRO for its victory, but added that the fatality and other violent incidents indicated that the conduct of the elections had been "unacceptable." DUI's Ahmeti said that, rather than a "day of joy and freedom," Election Day had been "a blood bath" orchestrated by DPA. He added that the results in Election District 6 and in the municipality of Saraj in Election District 1 were unacceptable because of intimidation of observers and electoral officials. OBSERVERS CONDEMN IRREGULARITIES -------------------------------- ¶8. (SBU) Throughout the day on June 1, the Embassy was in touch with all parties, urging them to calm their activists and stop the violence. The Ambassador called the PM and urged him to exert pressure over his coalition partner DPA to stop the harassment and violence. Her intervention appeared to result in the early afternoon arrest of DPA-affiliated crime boss Agim Krasniqi and some of his associates, all of them implicated in numerous violent incidents on Election Day, on charges of organizing a group to prevent others from voting. ¶9. (SBU) On June 2, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) made public its preliminary conclusions from the June 1 elections. Although the elections were "well administered procedurally," ODIHR assessed that Macedonia had failed to meet "key OSCE and Council of Europe commitments" due to "a failure to prevent violent acts" and "the limited and selective enforcement of laws." ODIHR concluded that the overall assessment of the June 1 elections "will depend on whether the authorities will thoroughly investigate these serious violations." ¶10. (U) Earlier the same day, the local election monitoring NGO MOST said that "isolated but serious" incidents had SKOPJE 00000359 003 OF 003 tarnished the integrity of the elections in certain areas of the country. Only the SEC's readiness for quick and efficient reruns in a wide range of "problematic places," according to MOST, would improve the overall situation after the elections. COMMENT ------- ¶11. (SBU) These elections represent a significant setback for Macedonia's democratic development, and for its NATO membership prospects. We, the EU, OSCE, and ODIHR have given the GOM room to repair the damage, however, if the government ensures free, fair and peaceful reruns. Gruevski has pledged to do that, and we will do our utmost to ensure he follows through on his commitment and returns Macedonia to the positive course it was on before he made the fateful decision to call the early elections. Milovanovic


Macedonia: Rumored Plans For Constitutional Changes And Concentration Of Political Power May Threaten Office Of The President

http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08SKOPJE438&q=macedonia

¶2. (S/NF) According to a wide range of credible sources, PM Gruevski's VMRO-led coalition plans to amend the constitution to allow for indirect election, by parliament, of the President (head of state). VMRO's new coalition partner, eAlbanian DUI, has indicated to us that it would support such an amendment. Such an action would end direct popular election for the office of the President, one of the few checks and balances on government in this young democracy. This has been a long-standing goal of Gruevski's, and with his new 82-seat governing majority (reftel), he now has the means to achieve it through a constitutional amendment. ¶3. (S/NF) Limiting the President's independence through indirect elections would clear the way for a system in which the party in government could act without the possibility of dissenting views from the President, undermining democracy in Macedonia. It would give the ruling party control over appointment of the Chief of Defense Staff in the Ministry of Defense (MOD), weakening the civilian-military separation of power in the MOD. It also would give the ruling party additional influence over the appointment of Macedonia's ambassadors, further concentrating power in the government. ¶4. (S/NF) The change from a direct to indirect election of the President would be retrogressive and harmful to democratic development in Macedonia. Although the constitutional powers of the President are limited, the traditional independence of that office has had an important tempering effect on government policies and attitudes. In recent months, the most notable example of this moderating influence relates to the name dispute. President Crvenkovski's more flexible position related to the name negotiations, coupled with his statesmanship on the issue, was critical in persuading the government to accept the pre-Bucharest Nimetz proposal, and helped moderate public opinion on the issue. Removing a directly elected President and further limiting his/her independence would clear the way for a mono-party system that could act without regard to minority political views. ¶5. (S/NF) POLICY GUIDANCE REQUEST: We request the Department instruct us to use the considerable influence the USG enjoys here to persuade PM Gruevski and his coalition partners to refrain from pursuing any action to amend the constitution to allow for parliamentary election of the president, and to ask other influential domestic and international actors to discourage it as well. We would convey that message privately. Milovanovic

Bulgarian elections in 2001: A VMRO party received less than 4% of the vote and not gaining any seats. Although I can't imagine a Macedonian party gaining seats in Bulgaria:
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=01SOFIA3033&q=macedonia
 
New revelations from WikiLeaks show how the US micromanaged Haiti's economy and politics to align it to US interests for the last 10 years. Wikileaks reports includes how US textile giants like Levis forced Haitian leaders to keep the salaries of Haitian workers as low as 3$ per day. Also US energy giants prevented Venezuelan PM to give oil to poor Haiti in lower prices than western energy giants offers;

YouTube - ‪WikiLeaks documents probe US-Haiti relations‬‏

No wonder why US army has been invaded Haitian parliament and whole country with 20.000+ soldiers after the last year`s devastating earthquake in there. I remember that an American pastor said that God punishes Haitians with earthquakes because they fought against French to end their colonial rule in there and they used voodoo magic for that. This tactic never gets old for two millenia; Abuse the religion and manipulate the messes for your own benefit.

Thats typical US, the prime evil.
 
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I have made occasional links to this site but I now see that there is a Macedonian contributor to WL Central! Check out his articles in Macedonian:

-http://wlcentral.org/node/1895
-http://wlcentral.org/node/1896
-http://wlcentral.org/node/1897
-http://wlcentral.org/node/1898
-http://wlcentral.org/node/1899
-http://wlcentral.org/node/1900
-http://wlcentral.org/node/1901

He also links to the official cables.

Cheers!
 
Is Greece seriously scared of Macedonia?
-http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08ATHENS576&q=macedonia

They are not scared they just want to play the victim innocence role in a very nasty childish way and try to make us look bad in front of other nations.


Anyway, great posts, thanks man!
 
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