2011-06-03 Wikileaks cables falsified - Macedonian ruling party claims
http://wlcentral.org/node/1841
Two cables, exposing the use of the state repressive apparatus by the Macedonian PM Gruevski to quell dissent and the corruption in the Gruevski inner circle, were immediately denied as falsification in an official statement of the ruling party VMRO - DPMNE.
[09SKOPJE601] MACEDONIA: GOVERNMENT USES STATE ORGANS TO ENFORCE LOYALTY AND SILENCE DISSENT
[09SKOPJE332] MACEDONIA: DANGEROUS DRIFT?
The diplomatic reports from the Embassy of Skopje were analyzed and published first by the WL partner's site Bivol and the european portal EurActiv on Friday. Macedonia is preparing for parliamentary elections this Sunday.
The cables are fake and fabricated by the opposition party SDSM and the A1 television, the official Gruevski's party statement claims. According to the text "financial and political interest" are motivating this falsification.
Another pro-government analyst went further in this logic and accused Greek secret services to help SDSM.
Macedonia and Greece has a long running and unresolved dispute about the name of the former yougoslav republic.
Wikileaks material has been denied authenticity many times. Last known case came from Bulgaria, where the PM Boyko Borissov, who's shady activities were exposed in a US cable, said he's "not reading Wikileaks and tabloids".
As a Wikileaks partner for the Balkans, Bivol strictly follows the agreement terms, publishing the original material after analysis and editing of sensitive names in the text. Bivol helped Wikileaks publish more then 70 cables from Bulgaria, Serbia and Macedonia that has never been denied by US State department.
https://www.balkanleaks.eu/en/09skopje601.html
Published by Wikileaks & Bivol.bg
date: 12/14/2009 9:11
refid: 09SKOPJE601
origin: Embassy Skopje
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09SKOPJE522
header:
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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0601/01 3480911
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 140911Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8750
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0579
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000601
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV, XG, ZL, MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: GOVERNMENT USES STATE ORGANS TO ENFORCE
LOYALTY AND SILENCE DISSENT
REF: SKOPJE 522
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Reeker for reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Over the past month, it appears that Prime
Minister Gruevski and his VMRO inner circle have used the
judicial and policing arms of the state to enforce party
discipline and quell dissent, which has contributed to an
increasing climate of fear. The government has been using a
catch-all corruption charge of "abuse of office" or "misuse
of official position" against members of the political elite
in Macedonia. Highly publicized arrests, detentions or
investigations of current and former ministers, party
members, and the opposition have put pressure on the
political elite in Macedonia to refrain from challenging or
criticizing the Gruevski government. We have also heard
complaints from non-governmental organizations whose members
have been called in by the police for "informative talks" on
their actions. Moreover, these tactics can be sold to the
Macedonian public as the government's valiant efforts against
corruption, which helps maintain public support for these
abusive actions.
Friends Become Enemies of the State: Trenkoski and Besimi
-------------------------------------
2. (C) One recent high profile arrest was of Georgi
Trenkoski, former manager of the Macedonian Health Fund and
ruling VMRO-DPMNE party member. Trenkoski had the reputation
for being one of the cleanest bureaucrats in the Macedonian
Government and was given a "gold star" award for excellent
management in 2007. In July, he resigned from his position on
principle, disagreeing with Gruevski,s current policies. He
is also an alumnus of the U.S. State Department's Ron Brown
Fellowship Program and has close ties to the international
community. On 3 November, he was publicly arrested on charges
of "misuse of official position" and accused of authorizing
the payment of a pharmaceutical company twice for the same
shipment. Trenkoski told the Ambassador before his arrest
that he had been threatened with legal action by the PM,s
Chief of Staff Martin Protoger. Protoger hotly denied this to
us. The arrest occurred on the street with press
"conveniently" nearby--it was evident that select "government
friendly" media were tipped off ahead of the arrest. The
papers condemned Trenkoski as corrupt and ran with the story
immediately after he was picked up by police.
3. (C) In a 10 November meeting with the Ambassador, fellow
Ron Brown alumni and close associates of Trenkoski informed
the Ambassador that the entire event was politically
motivated and engineered by the Prime Minister for the sake
of punishing Trenkoski for speaking out of turn even though
he did so privately. They firmly believed that Trenkoski was
innocent and that the charges were meant as a message, not
only to him, but to others who might consider crossing the
party. They claimed Gruevski was making an example out of
Trenkoski and that he was using his political power over the
judiciary to bring &trumped up8 charges against political
enemies.
4. (C) Another notable case is the recent allegation against
Minister of Economy Fatmir Besimi for the previous
government's decision to sell shares of Skopje,s
publicly-owned transport company. (Besimi held the same
position in the 2002-2006 SDSM-DUI government.) A preliminary
investigation into the legality of the sale was opened in
2007, but did not lead to any arrests or charges. Allegations
in the case resurfaced 7-8 November against Besimi (and
former SDSM Finance Minister Popovski), almost four years
after the event in question. Both Besimi and especially
Popovski enjoy reputations as clean politicians, a relative
rarity here. In a 12 November meeting, Besimi told us that he
sees clear political motives for this case, mainly to ruin
his reputation, to reduce his effectiveness in seeking reform
in the energy sector, and perhaps to pressure DUI leader Ali
Ahmeti to fire him or force his resignation. He is determined
not to resign, but if indeed criminal charges are brought
against him, he feels he would have to do so as he could not
carry out his duties effectively. Besimi told the Ambassador
on 23 November that he thought the current threat had passed,
but he noted that government investigators are always
snooping around his ministry and collecting data that VMRO
can use against him. Popovski was questioned for hours by a
plain clothes police officers, but no charges have been
levied as of 25 November.
Pre Trial Detention: A Method to Create Fear and Ruin
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Reputations
---------------------------------------
5. (C) Macedonian law allows for people accused of a crime to
spend time in pre-trial detention (or jail) for a minimum of
30 days, with a possible extension to 180 days if a council
of three judges orders a 60-day extension for further
investigation and a superior court offers an additional
90-day extension, allowed only in cases for which the crime
under investigation is subject to a sentencing guideline of
at least 5 years. The detention period gives the
investigative judge time to interview witnesses without
interference by the defendant, but it also can be ordered if
the judge feels the defendant might flee or might commit the
same or another crime. In some cases, the judge will "amend"
the charges to allow for more time behind bars. Pre-trial
detention is an effective tool for a government that wants to
create a climate of fear because not only does it lock
someone in jail for at least 30 days, it also does
irreparable damage to their public and professional
reputation. The accused's reputation often does not recover,
even if they are eventually acquitted of the charges.
6. (C) When on November 10 Trenkoski appeared to face a more
serious charge and the likelihood of additional weeks of jail
time, his lawyers applied for bail to release him. (Court
sources and other contacts informed us that, although all the
witnesses had been interviewed, the judge was considering
additional, more serious charges and ordering expert
testimony that would have kept Trenkoski in jail for an
additional undefined amount of time.) After a text message
from the U.S. Embassy to the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff
Protoger, and a follow-up phone conversation, Trenkoski was
released on 11 November. Most likely he will eventually have
to stand trial for the charges. Even if he is acquitted of
all charges, the damage to his reputation has already been
done.
Let's Not Forget the Opposition
--------------------------
7. (SBU) In addition to enforcing discipline in the party and
governing coalition, Gruevski also uses his control over the
judicial and policing functions of the state to attempt to
silence the opposition. The arrest and detention in August
2008 of SDSM Vice-President and Strumica mayor Zoran Zaev,
was an early indicator of the government's tactics. Although
Zaev won reelection in March 2009, in the last two weeks, he
is one of five members of the opposition SDSM party that have
been charged with this same &abuse of office/misuse of
official position charges8 for corruption. On 4 November,
the government floated allegations in the press that former
President and current SDSM leader Branko Crvenkovski and his
cabinet used thousands of denar of state money for personal
use during his time as president. The SDSM spokesperson
publicly accused the government of using the judiciary to
attack its political opposition and create a psychological
climate of fear among the public against questioning or
criticizing the government.
8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX
9. (SBU) Two SDSM youth members were questioned for several
hours by police on 21 November for distributing leaflets
about a local the poor government practices of a local mayor.
The party members told the press that the incident was
intimidation and an attempt by the government to silence the
opposition. The police claim that the mayor filed a complaint
against the two youth, and they were obliged to investigate
the complaint, but admitted to the press that the youth did
nothing illegal.
9. (C) Slajana Taseva, head of the Macedonian NGO
SKOPJE 00000601 003 OF 003
Transparency Zero Corruption, has complained to European
diplomats and in the media that recently she has been
harassed by police, being called into their headquarters at
night for lengthy "informative talks" on her behavior and
criticism of the government. Although she has not been
formally charged or under arrest, she received an official
summons from the police. When she arrived at the police
station with her attorney, she was given "friendly advice"
about her work on anticorruption. Other NGOs have made
similar claims.
COMMENT
-------
9. (C) The political influence of Gruevski on the judicial
and policing arms of the government is no secret. This latest
spate of public arrests, accusations, and indictments shows a
definite spike in such interference and manipulation. We have
received an increasing number of complaints about late night
"informative talks" with the police and threats from the
government about possible "corruption charges" that may be
investigated should people chose to defy the government or
speak out. Meanwhile, there is no action against Gruevski's
insiders widely reputed to be corrupt, such as intelligence
director Sasho Majalkov (also Gruevski's cousin) and Minister
or Transport and Communications Mile Janakieski. It is
possible that Gruevski is lashing out as he feels especially
vulnerable now. International and domestic pressures are
building to solve the "name issue" with Greece or face the
prospect of not being able to commence EU membership
negotiations, despite receiving a favorable report from the
EU commission (see REFTEL). These cases distract public
attention away from the name issue and give Gruevski an
enhanced sense of control. We will continue to use our
influence judiciously to counteract this tendency, in
specific cases when warranted. More broadly, we and the other
international actors here keep pressing for practical
measures to increase judicial independence, police and
prosecutorial professionalism, and promote rule of law.
REEKER
https://www.balkanleaks.eu/en/09skopje332.html
Published by Wikileaks & Bivol.bg
date: 7/10/2009 13:50
refid: 09SKOPJE332
origin: Embassy Skopje
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 09SKOPJE300
header:
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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0332/01 1911350
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101350Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8382
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0539
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SKOPJE 000332
SIPDIS
STATE ALSO FOR INR/B
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: DANGEROUS DRIFT?
REF: SKOPJE 300
Classified By: CDA Tom Navratil for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).
Summary
-------
1. (C) PM Gruevski's government continues a very mixed
performance. He and his closest cronies continue to engage
in highly questionable practices on government tenders and in
squeezing EVN, the Austrian-owned electricity distributor.
Substantial judicial reform lags, but Gruevski has directed
the Justice Ministry to take several steps to provide greater
transparency and adherence to European standards (reftel).
The EU will almost certainly grant Macedonia visa
liberalization starting next year, with a good possibility of
recommending a start date for accession talks in their annual
report this autumn. The June 30 resignation of DPM for
Euro-integration Bocevski underscored Macedonia's sluggish
forward progress, but also prompted Gruevski to do some
cabinet-cleaning. Gruevski may be seeking to distract the
public from focusing on the poor performance of his own
government and the economy, where the downturn is likely to
grow more severe, exacerbating societal tensions.
Interethnic and intra-Albanian relations continue to fray as
well. However, VMRO and DUI have recently engaged in more
practical power-sharing, as seen in DUI,s visible
participation in the name talks, agreement to take their
equitable representation/patronage concerns into account in
the revised police law, and allowing DUI to take over
management of the State University of Tetovo. We perceive a
greater willingness on Gruevski,s part to tackle the "name
issue," but he continues to insist on a referendum to avoid
personal responsibility for a historic compromise. End
summary.
Bocevski Rocks the Boat
-----------------------
2. (C) The sudden June 30 resignation of Deputy Prime
Minister for Euro-integration Ivica Bocevski has touched off
a storm of political rumors and public accusations, with some
observers even questioning whether PM Gruevski -- though he
holds nearly all the instruments of political power -- is
still in control. United for Macedonia leader (and former
VMRO Interior Minister) Ljube Boskoski called for Gruevski to
resign over the weekend, citing the GoM's failures in
achieving Euro-Atlantic integration and managing the economy,
which continues to falter. Nervous GoM ministers and VMRO
insiders have hinted privately to us of dissent within the
party (over which Gruevski is normally reputed to have an
iron grip) over these issues and allegations that Gruevski
cousin (and intel chief) Saso Mijalkov is implicated in a
corruption scandal surrounding the purchase of double-decker
buses made in China.
3. (C) For his part, Bocevski told the Ambassador that as DPM
he never got Gruevski's backing to make the real reforms
necessary to meet key EU benchmarks, adding that he believes
Gruevski may never have wanted real reform in key areas such
as an independent judiciary. When he felt he could make no
more progress, Bocevski said, he had no choice but to resign.
Bocevski senior aide Pero Dimsoski -- a U.S. citizen who
returned to Macedonia to take this position -- told the
Ambassador that Gruevski and Gruevski's chief of staff,
Martin Protoger, pressured him after Dimsoski told the press
that Gruevski must take more responsibility for Macedonia's
Euro-integration.
Ministers Shuffle, but Real Changes?
------------------------------------
4. (C) As Protoger told us July 6, Gruevski took the
opportunity of Bocevski's departure to do some housecleaning
in his cabinet. The PM called the Charge July 8 to run
through the changes. DPM for the Economy Zoran Stavreski
will move over to replace Trajko Slaveski as Finance Minister
(but retains his DPM rank), and Vladimir Pesevski will
replace Stavreski as DPM for the Economy. Ljupco Dimovski
replaces Aco Spasenovski as Agriculture Minister, and Nikola
Todorov takes over from Pero Stojanovski as Education
Minister. Gruevski also confirmed that he will name Vasko
Naumovski to replace Bocevski as DPM for Euro-integration, as
the press has been reporting for several days. Brief bios
paras. 14-17.
5. (C) Gruevski told the Charge that he had considered firing
Justice Minister Mihajlo Manevski -- by most accounts, a
corrupt minister notorious for bullying judges and
prosecutors to secure decisions consistent with his own or
party interests -- but decided not to so as not to be seen as
SKOPJE 00000332 002 OF 004
knuckling under to the opposition SDSM's claim that Manevski
double-dipped by receiving both a government pension and
salary. Gruevski asserted that the pension issue was merely
a systems error that affected about 150 people and amounted
to only $400. Additionally, Gruevski told the Charge that he
was generally satisfied with the ministers from DUI, his
ethnic Albanian partner, and had no plans to seek their
ouster (which would have required DUI's consent). He added
that the only DUI minister he had concerns about was
Environment Minister Nexhati Jakupi, but DUI leader Ali
Ahmeti preferred to keep him on. (Subsequently, DUI Minister
of Economy Fatmir Besimi told us that he may be forced to
resign in the coming weeks over the GoM's handling of EVN,
the Austrian electricity distributor which Gruevski seems
intent on forcing out of Macedonia.)
6. (C) According to Macedonian law, had Gruevski sought to
replace seven or more ministers this would have meant a full
change in government and could have caused some political
upheaval such as re-negotiating Gruevski's coalition deal
with DUI. It would have also meant a delay of up to 40 days
to form the new government. As it stands now, the opposition
in parliament can only raise concerns about the portfolios of
the ministers to be replaced, and the new ministers will be
in place as soon as July 10.
Economic Slide Continues, No Real GoM Response
--------------------------------------------- -
7. (SBU) Dreary economic news continues to flow in. GDP in
the first quarter was down 0.9%, with nearly all sectors
reporting flat or negative growth. DPM Stavreski tried to
spin this performance as a success of GOM policies, noting
greater downturns in other countries. He predicted positive
GDP growth in the third and fourth quarters, but did not
explain the assumptions on which he based this forecast.
Indeed, key economic indicators are showing a different
picture. Industrial output fell by 11.1% from January to
May. The trade deficit for the same period reached $951
million, or 10% of GDP. Exports are down 43.4%, and imports
dropped by 32.9%.
8. (SBU) FDI in the first quarter was only $70.7 million,
none of which are greenfield investments; most consisted of
reinvested profits, re-capitalization, and/or already present
foreign investors bringing in more equipment and assets. Net
private transfers, which include remittances, were down by
38.6% in the first quarter, thus pushing the current account
deficit to $445 million (5% of GDP). Budget revenues from
January to May were down over 10%, mostly due to the sharp
decline of 25% in VAT collections (VAT accounts for about 40%
of total revenues). At the same time, expenditures were up
by over 21% as the GOM will apparently not give up
unproductive projects. Trying to cover the budget and
current account gaps, the GOM just recently sold another
Eurobond, collecting 175 million euros at an interest rate of
9.875%. In addition, it continuously borrows domestically by
selling denar and forex T-bills with different maturities.
Responding to a loosened fiscal policy, monetary policy is
very tight, resulting in increasing interest rates. Despite
its apparent need to take on an IMF standby agreement to
stanch the flow, the GoM seems resolved to take commercial
loans to cover its budget obligations, viewing the IMF and
its conditionality/scrutiny as a last resort.
"Name" and Albanian Woes
------------------------
9. (C) The heat is also being turned up on the "name issue"
and interethnic relations. UN Mediator Nimetz was in Skopje
July 6-7, then went to Athens. Gruevski told the Charge July
8 that the visit was positive and progress may be possible,
"depending on the Greeks." Meanwhile, the DUI and VMRO
leaderships have been locked in what Protoger told us were
"serious but positive" negotiations on a raft of DUI demands,
ranging from the rights and roles of DUI ministers, GoM
spending in predominantly e-Albanian municipalities, the
draft law on the Interior Ministry, implementation of the
language law, and a host of others.
10. (SBU) Intra-Albanian discord is also on the rise. DPA
leader Menduh Thaci formally released his proposal for a new
interethnic agreement -- intended to replace the Ohrid
Framework Agreement -- on July 6. Thaci has admitted to our
EUSR colleagues that this new document is nothing more than a
way to score points against DUI, and Thaci may use his
proposal as a way to coalesce other smaller e-Albanian
parties into his orbit. Among other things, Thaci's
"political contract" calls for consensual government
decision-making (i.e., the e-Albanian party in government
gets a veto), Albanian as an official language, and that one
SKOPJE 00000332 003 OF 004
of the three most powerful political offices (Prime Minister,
President, Speaker) always be held by an e-Albanian. (More
on this issue septel.)
DUI "Retakes" University
------------------------
11. (SBU) DUI made its own power play July 2 when, armed with
an order from then Education Minister Stojanovski, its
loyalists entered the State University of Tetovo (SUT) and
summarily dismissed Acting Rector Agim Vela and the entire
university Senate (vice rectors and deans). While they are
at pains to claim that this is not the case, DUI's actions
are strikingly similar to what DPA did in 2006 when it joined
the government, marched in with thugs, and eventually
installed its own rector, Sadi Bexheti (who is now DPA's
mayor of Tetovo). The university is now quite tense, with
"off-duty" police loyal to DUI "maintaining order" and
keeping faculty and staff loyal to DPA off the premises. For
his part, Bexheti and Vela told us July 8 that they will
fight the issue in the domestic courts and the European Court
of Human Rights.
12. (SBU) SUT has always been a troubled institution,
including its history as an illegal university beginning in
1994. After it became a state university 10 years later, it
has been essentially treated as a fiefdom of whichever
e-Albanian party is in government. Most e-Macedonians and
many e-Albanians tell us SUT is often chaotic and -- at best
-- just another relatively poor public university. DUI's
efforts to persuade the public -- and us -- that its actions
are legitimate ring hollow.
Comment: Icebergs Ahead
-----------------------
13. (C) Gruevski has in the past been reluctant to fire
ministers, even poor performers (as most are), but rumors
persist that there is increasing unhappiness with the current
slate from within VMRO. Even this relatively modest shuffle
allows him to distract the public from focusing on issues
such as the economy, the name issue, interethnic relations,
and criticism of Gruevski for moving too slowly toward
Euro-Atlantic integration. As Macedonia continues to drift
in the wrong direction on many of these issues, Gruevski,s
responses seem too small and too slow as he clings to his
preferred positions and approaches. He will need to make
bold course changes to meet Macedonia,s major external and
internal challenges successfully. End comment.
Brief Ministerial Bios
----------------------
14. (SBU) Valdimir Pesevski, Deputy PM for the Economy:
Pesevski was born in 1970, and takes up the DPM slot from his
previous position as Director General of SEAF (Small
Enterprise Assistance Funds) South Balkan Fund based in
Belgrade, Serbia. He has been there since 2005, covering
SEAF projects in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro.
Previously, he worked in SEAF Macedonia moving up the ladder
to Director's position. He received his BA in Electrical
Engineering at the University of Saints Cyril and Methodius
in Skopje in 1993 and then began his career as a Research
Assistant in the Macedonian Institute for Energy and Computer
Science. In 1995 he moved to the MBRC (Macedonian Business
Resource Center), a USAID-funded project, where he worked as
a consultant providing general management and financial
consulting services to medium and large Macedonian companies.
Pesevski joined SEAF-Macedonia's local management team in
1998. He received his MBA (with distinction) from Sheffield
University, where he has also been guest lecturer in the
Executive MBA program at the campus in Thessaloniki. He also
advised the President of Macedonia on economic policies for
SMEs following the conflict of 2001 and is an active member
of the National Entrepreneurship and Competitiveness Council.
He speaks fluent English.
15. (SBU) Vasko Naumovski, DPM for Euro-integration:
Naumovski was born in Skopje in 1980, and takes up the DPM
slot from his previous position as Assistant Professor at the
New York University Skopje. During the 2009 presidential and
municipal elections, he was a frequent pro-VMRO-DPMNE
television commentator/analyst. He received his BA in
International Law at the University of Saints Cyril and
Methodius in Skopje in 2003, and from there he pursued two
masters degrees, one in European Studies at the
Rheinische-Friedrich-Wilhelms University of Bonn, Germany,
and the second in International Law at the University of
Saints Cyril and Methodius in Skopje. He received his Ph.D.
in International Law from the same institution in 2008.
Prior to his employment at New York University Skopje he was
SKOPJE 00000332 004 OF 004
a project analyst for a project on coordination of foreign
aid with UNDP and the Ministry of Justice. Naumovski
attended a six-week Study of U.S. Institutions (SUSI) program
in the U.S. in 2008. He speaks fluent English.
16. (SBU) Ljupco Dimovski, Minister of Agriculture: Dimovski
was born in Veles in 1959, and takes up the Agriculture
portfolio from his previous position as Deputy Minister of
Transport and Communications. He received his BA in
international finance and banking at the University of Saints
Cyril and Methodius in Skopje. He began working in 1986 as
deputy director at Tehnometal-Vardar AD Skopje, a trading
company. In 1998 he became the Director General of Electric
Industries Skopje. In 2005 he became the Director General of
Parks and Forests Skopje (a public company). Dimovski served
as Secretary General of the Socialist Party of Macedonia from
2004 to 2005. He speaks English and Spanish.
17. (SBU) Nikola Todorov, Minister of Education: Todorov was
born in 1978 and takes up his position as Minister of
Education from his previous position as head of the Skopje
Cadastre (land registry) office. In recent years the
cadastre office, with funding from the World Bank, undertook
major customer-service reforms and moved to a modern new
facility, making it one of the best-run cadastres in the
region, according to World Bank sources. Todorov was advisor
to the former director of Public Enterprise for Management of
Residential and Commercial Properties of the Republic of
Macedonia. He is the son of Stojan Todorov, who recently
resigned as Secretary-General of the Government. He has a
law degree; English-language ability unknown.
NAVRATIL
Finally stuff about Macedonia!
This is what Wikileaks had to say about the matter:
https://www.facebook.com/wikileaks/posts/119559604794625